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There's no disaster that can't become a blessing, and no blessing
that can't become a disaster.
-

Richard Bach

Redlining is a discriminatory practice that prohibits certain individuals
from acquiring property.' Traditionally, redlining has been described as "credit
discrimination based upon the characteristics of the neighborhood surrounding
the borrower's dwelling." 2 "A neighborhood becomes redlined when a lending
institution presumes the area is no longer economically stable because of age,
race, composition or other characteristics." 3 Redlining occurs when "entire
blocks of neighborhoods are simply declared off-limits for lending, either by
having a line drawn around them, or by custom and practice." 4 Redlining has a
5
devastating effect because the presumption becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Although redlining is traditionally seen in the context of financial lending, it can be seen in other contexts, as well. As an example, "insurance
redlining" is the discriminatory unavailability of insurance. 6 Insurance redlining
"* Senior Associate, Kunz Plitt Hyland Demlong & Kleifield, P.C.; J.D. Arizona State
University, cum
laude, 1997. Mr. Maldonado's practice focuses on employment discrimination law and complex insurance
coverage and bad faith cases. Mr. Maldonado is an associate author of COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d.
See, e.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 328-29
(7th Cir. 2004) (describing "redlining" as the practice of denying the extension of credit to specific geographic
areas based upon the income, race, or ethnicity of its residents); Honorable v. Easy life Real Estate Sys., 100 F.
Supp. 2d 885, 892 (N.D. II. 2000) ("Redlining is the practice of denying the extension of credit to specific
geographic areas due to the income, race, or ethnicity of its residents."). In addition to mortgage redlining and
insurance redlining, the FHA prohibits racial steering, exclusionary zoning decisions, and other actions by
individuals or governmental units that directly affect the availability of housing to minorities. Southend
Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n. v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984)
(describing court holdings on the meaning of "otherwise make available or deny" in section 3604(a) of the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1978)).
2
Conference of Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1979).
3
Edward Larkin, Note, Redlining: Remedies for Victims of Urban Disinvestment, 5 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 83, 83-84 (1976).
Daniel Searing, Discrimination in Home Financing, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1973).
5
See David 1.Badain, Insurance Redlining in the Future of the Urban Core, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 5(1980) (describing the "cycle of disinvestment" that occurred in urban areas as a result of suburban
out-migration).
6
See, e.g., id. at 4 ("In its traditional definition, 'redlining' is the outright refusal of an insurance
company or lending institution to provide services solely on the basis of a property's geographical location.").
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impairs the ability of individuals of a protected class to acquire property because
procuring insurance is a prerequisite to obtaining a mortgage.7
Insurance redlining can take on the characteristics of a corporate
chameleon which is difficult to identify and then regulate. Insurance underwriting practices, as an example, focus upon demographic risk factors which are
mathematically modeled upon actual loss criteria.8 The higher potential for loss
in minority-dominated geographic areas is predictable based upon fundamental
principles of risk that are at the center of insurance theory and practice. 9
Concerns over insurance redlining have been thrust into the political
arena in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Insured losses for Hurricane
Katrina covered by private insurance carriers are estimated at $40 to $60 billion,
with total damages estimated at $200 billion. 10 Hurricane Katrina is expected to
exceed Hurricane Andrew and the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, as the
highest insured loss from a single event in the history of the United States.1 1 As
a result, insurance companies will develop plans to reduce their exposure to loss
in the disaster-prone Gulf Coast areas. Such plans will be deemed necessary to
protect remaining policyholders who would otherwise be left without coverage if
a company became insolvent due to another catastrophic hurricane. These types
of plans may include significant cancellations and non-renewals of existing
homeowner policies, or, in the case of some of the hardest-hit insurers, withdrawal from the state's residential property and casualty insurance marketplace.
Because of the racial demographics of coastal Alabama, Mississippi and
Louisiana, mass policy cancellations, non-renewals, or the withdrawal of
insurance companies from the state's residential property and casualty insurance
marketplace in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina threatens to create de facto
redlining.
Minorities had higher levels of property damage from Hurricane Katrina
in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana compared to whites, largely because of
segregated housing in older and more poorly constructed homes.12 Black
7
See, e.g., Dana L. Kaersvang, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowner's
Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1993, 1995 (2006) ("The unavailability of homeowners insurance in black
neighborhoods contributes to the gap in homeownership rates.").
8
See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairnessin InsuranceRisk Classification,71
VA. L. REv. 403 (1985) (discussing the methods insurers use to classify potential insureds and the possibilities
for discrimination).
9

0

See generally id.
Rawle 0. King, Hurricane Katrina: Insurance Losses & National Capacities for Financing

DisasterRisk, CRS Report for Congress, at CRS-4 (Sept. 15, 2005).
1
See id. at CRS-5, tbl. I (stating that Hurricane Andrew resulted in insured property losses in excess
of $15.5 billion, and the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center resulted in insured property losses of $18.8
billion).
12
See Gulf Coast Recovery Act: Hearingon S. 1761 Before the Subcomm. on Superfund and Waste
Managementof the S. Comm. on Environment andPublic Works, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Dr. Beverly Wright, Director, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Xavier University)
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families were also less likely to have purchased insurance to cover property
damage and
temporary living expenses resulting from a disaster like Hurricane
3
Katrina.'
Generally, black families were less likely than white families to have
purchased insurance with major insurance companies, largely because of decades
of insurance redlining.14 A side effect of "insurance redlining," for example, is
that black families were more likely than white families to receive insufficient
settlement amounts after Hurricane Katrina because of limited coverages
available from insurance companies that did issue policies.' 5 As a result, black
families may be less likely to rebuild after Hurricane Katrina, 16 which would
significantly reduce black ownership in the affected coastal areas. Those
individuals who can obtain insurance at what will likely be a higher insurance
premium are those individuals that knowingly chose to forego full insurance
coverage in light of the future risks, and will rebuild. Consequently, the indirect
effect of redlining is that the demographics of the areas devastated by Hurricane
Katrina in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana may change drastically.17
(noting differences in property damage because of housing demographics).
13

Id.

Id. (stating that black were less likely to have insurance because of redlining). For a discussion of
the environmental and discriminatory effect of Hurricane Katrina, see generally MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN
14

THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENViRONMENT, DISASTER AND RACE AFTER KATRINA (2006).

15
See Hearings,supra note 12 (testimony and statement of Dr. Beverly Wright, Director, Deep South
Center for Environmental Justice, Xavier University) (noting the difference in settlement amounts of whites and
blacks).
16
This is because they were either uninsured, underinsured, or otherwise did not have the funds to
rebuild.
17
On January 9, 2006, the Equal Justice Society (EJS), a national advocacy organization that advances
social and racial justice through law and public policy, along with thirty-six other American civil society
organizations submitted a collaborative memorandum to the United Nations Human Rights Committee detailing
various human rights concerns, including, among others, the United States government's failure to "guarantee
equal and effective protection against racial discrimination in the context of disaster rescue, relief and
reconstruction efforts" in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Memorandum of U.S. Civil Society
Organizations and Advocates to the Members of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, List of
Concerns for the Review of the U.S. Second and Third Periodic Report 38 (Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with the
author). EJS asserted that the United States government was in violation of Article 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Id. The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on December 16, 1966, and ratified by the United States Senate in 1992. 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01
(1992) (noting that the ratification was subject to a number of reservations, understandings, and declarations).
Article 26 provides:

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668.
In addition, the federal government has an affirmative duty to protect the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the border of a State and the right to housing free from discrimination on the basis of race.
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5, Nov. 20, 1994, 660
U.N.T.S. 195. EJS has demanded that Congress insist that Katrina victims have a right to return and a right to
funds to rebuild their homes and lives and that FEMA develop a plan to make return possible. Equal Justice
Soc'y et al., Petition to President George W. Bush, United States Congress, Department Of Homeland Security,
Federal Emergency Management Agency and the United Nations, 15 (Nov. 14, 2005) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
The U.S. Senate has declared that articles 1 through 27 of the ICCPR are not self-executing. 138 CONG.
REC. 54781-84 (1992); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 372 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Neither the American
Declaration nor the International Covenant is self-executing, nor has Congress enacted implementing legislation
for either agreement."); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267-68 (5th Ci. 2001) (citing cases and other
sources indicating that the ICCPR is not self-executing). The Senate has also declared that the ratification of the
ICCPR does not create a private cause of action in American Courts. S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 15 (1992);
see also Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (1952) (holding that if a treaty or covenant is not selfexecuting and Congress has not implemented the treaty with legislation, no private fight of action is created by
ratification).
Thus, while the ICCPR is binding upon the United States as a matter of international law, it does not form
part of the domestic law of the United States. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that not every treaty to which the United States is a party acts to limit the jurisdiction of American
courts and that the treaty affects the law of the United States only when the treaty is given effect by
congressional legislation or if the treaty by its nature is self-executing) (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1987) ("Courts in the United
States are bound to give effect to international law and to international agreements, except that a 'non-selfexecuting' agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary authority."). Because the
United States has yet to adopt the ICCPR's Optional Protocol that provides individual claimants with direct
access for the adjudication of claims to the United Nations Human Rights Committee once domestic remedies
are exhausted, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States
(OAS) may arguably be the only international forum that American citizens can utilize for claims arising under
the ICCPR involving individual complaints of human rights violations. See Organization of American States,
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, Arts. 44-51, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter American Convention on Human Rights]. Article XVII of the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man which was approved by the Ninth International Conference of American States in 1948
provides, "Every person has the right to be recognized everywhere as a person having rights and obligations,
and to enjoy the basic civil rights." American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX,
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration].
Article XXIII provides, "Every person has a right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of
decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home." Id. Any person or
nongovernmental entity legally recognized in a member state of the OAS may submit petitions to the
Commission with regard to alleged violations of a human right recognized in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man or the American Convention on Human Rights. See Rules of Procedure of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the InterAmerican System, OEA/Ser.LIV/I.4 rev.9 (2003).
Courts have held that the "American Declaration... is an aspirational document which.., did not on its
own create any enforceable obligations on the part of any of the OAS member nations." See, e.g., Garza v.
Lappin, 253 F.3d 918,923 (7th Cir. 2001). Although the OAS developed the American Convention on Human
Rights, which creates an Inter-American Court of Human Rights whose decisions are potentially binding on
member nations, the United States signed the American Convention, but has not ratified it. Id. at 925.
Consequently, the American Convention does not yet qualify as a "treaty" of the United States that creates
binding obligations. Id.
While the ICCPR was not originated by the OAS, however, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, as well as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, is able to administer any international agreement
to which an OAS member state is subject. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, art.
64(1). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights authority under Article 64 would include interpreting
the ICCPR, the Geneva Conventions, and other international instruments. See Interpretation of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties ofMan Within the Framework ofArticle 64 of the American Convention
on Human Rights, Advisory Op. OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10 (July 14, 1989), reprinted in 11
HUM. RTs. L.J. 118, 126 (1990); see also Mark Wojcik, Using International Human Rights Law to Advance
Queer Rights: A Case Study of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 55 OHIO ST. L. J.
649, 654 (1994). Because the United States is a member state of the OAS and a signatory of the OAS Charter,
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This article discusses Federal and State remedies available to potential
victims of redlining. Specific emphasis is placed upon the issue of de facto
insurance redlining which may arise in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in the
minority-dominated geographic coastal areas of Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana. Part I of the article discusses the federal regulatory scheme
prohibiting discriminatory redlining. It first addresses the civil rights legislation
passed by Congress as embodied in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
pertaining to the property rights of minorities. Part I also discusses the Federal
Housing Act and other federal statutes as a means to proscribe "mortgage
redlining." Part I then addresses the possible utilization of the Fair Housing Act
as a means to proscribe "insurance redlining."
Part II of the Article discusses various state constitutional provisions,
statutes, regulations, and case law that may proscribe "insurance redlining." This
patchwork of assorted proscriptions is not uniform among the states. Part I11 of
the Article discusses the states' regulatory authority in proscribing "insurance
redlining." Part I briefly covers the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which allowed
the state regulation of insurance to prevail over general federal statutes. Part III
then discusses whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act preempts the proscription of
insurance redlining by the Federal Housing Act ("FHA"). The article answers
this question by asserting that the FHA does proscribe "insurance redlining" in
order to further the goal of equal access to housing.
Part IV of the article discusses, briefly, the emergency rules issued by
the Louisiana Department of Insurance to prevent insurance company conduct
which could contribute to de facto redlining in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. The state of Florida used a similar "moratorium" on policy cancellations and non-renewals in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. A moratorium
approach to de facto redlining has inherent constitutional hurdles which have to
be overcome. Part IV discusses the various constitutional challenges that
insurance companies may pursue as a result of any moratorium legislation,
including Takings Clause, Contract Clause, and Due Process Clause claims.
The authors conclude this analysis by proposing an amendment to the
FHA which would specifically preclude insurance redlining. Although the FHA
may be an ineffective legislative mechanism to prevent housing discrimination in

the United States is bound to respect the interpretive decisions of the Inter-American Commission relating to the
United State's obligations with respect to human rights. Charter of the Organziation of American States, 2
U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361; amended effective 1970,21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, arts. 53, 106 &
145. Under these auspices, should a Katrina victim decide, after exhausting any judicial remedies in American
courts, that their human rights as enumerated in the ICCPR were violated and not remedied, they could file a
petition with the Inter-American Commission to determine whether their human rights were violated.
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general, amending the FHA to include insurance
redlining would nevertheless
8
bring a national approach to the problem.'
I. An Overview of FederalRegulatory Authority
ProhibitingDiscriminatoryRedlining
A. History of Civil Rights Legislation Relevant to Redlining
In order to better understand the proscription of discriminatory housing
practices, including redlining, one must first start with an understanding of the
system of American government. The United States was formed as a dual
sovereignty system-the states and the federal government.19 As a republican
form of government, it is the duty of the states to protect the quality of rights of
its citizenry. 20 The federal government's purpose is to ensure that the states do
18

Although not specifically addressing the issue of redlining, there are other federal laws which may

be available to Katrina victims to protect them from discrimination. For example, the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (1988), and its
implementing regulations, 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.31-206.48 (1988), provide the statutory framework for the
President to declare an emergency or a major disaster. Section 308 of the Stafford Act prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, nationality, age, or economic status in the administration of disaster
assistance programs. Section 309 also prohibits all private relief organizations who participate in the response
and recovery effort from engaging in discrimination.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. "Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial discrimination in federally assisted programs including, of course,
public housing programs." Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 301-02 (1976). Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 expressly directs the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to "administer the programs
and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further" the Act's fair
housing policy. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5). If HUD officials are aware that a municipality's urban renewal
program results in the removal of a substantial portion of the municipality's minority population but approves
urban renewal housing project which displaces minority residents and the officials know of the nonexistence of
relocation programs for minority residents, HUD has violated Title VI prohibiting discrimination under
federally assisted programs and Title VIII. Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1246 (6th Cir. 1974).
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, precludes discrimination against
individuals with disabilities in all programs receiving funds from the federal government or programs operated
by the federal government. For a discussion of the rights and remedies under Section 504, see generally Steven
Plitt, Valerie J. Fasolo & Daniel Maldonado, The Struggle to Define The Rights and Remedies For Claims
Brought Under The Rehabilitation Act, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 269 (Fall 2003). Section 508 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(d), prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in
regard to federally operated technology systems.
19
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (stating that States possess sovereignty
concurrent with the federal government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution). For the advantages and disadvantages of the dual sovereignty system, see generally
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987);
Deborah Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L
REv. 1, 3-10 (1988).
20
See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) ("The equality of the rights of citizens is a
principle of republicanism. Every republican government is duty bound to protect all its citizens in the
enjoyment of this principle, if within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still
remains there.").
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not deny these rights to its citizens. 2 1 The right to purchase and own a home is a
fundamental part of citizenship. 22 Slaves, however, could not own anything,
23
could not enter into any contracts, and could not hold or transfer any property.
The Civil War was, in part, a result of the Union's efforts to ensure that slavery
was abolished in the southern states.24
After the Civil War ended in 1865, Congress adopted the Thirteenth and
Fourteen Amendments which were equally binding upon all the states.25 The
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in the United States and gave Congress
the power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation. 26 The Fourteenth Amendment provided, among other things, that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United... [and no State shall] deny to any person.., the equal protection of
the laws."27 Although a principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
protect persons of color, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
broad language of the Amendment as sufficient to protect all persons, regardless
of race, against discriminatory legislation by the states. 28 The Fourteenth
29
Amendment, however, does not prohibit private discriminatory conduct.
21

See id.(describing the purpose of federal government). Under the Constitution, blacks were not

intended to be included as citizens, but were considered property and "regarded as beings of an inferior
order.. ., altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393, 407 (1856).
22 See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have
meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized."); McDonald
v. Verble, 622 F.2d 1227, 1232 (6th Cir. 1980); State v. Joseph, 68 So. 211, 211 (La. 1915) (noting that the
Thirteenth Amendment was enacted to allow all races to enjoy fundamental rights including the right to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, and convey property).
23 See generally W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION INAMERICA 10 (1964).
24
Cf Ex parte Commonwealth of Va., 100 U.S. 339, 363 (1879) ("The institution of slavery in a
portion of the country was the cause of constant irritation and crimination between the people of the States
where it existed and those of the free States, which finally led to a rupture between them and to the civil war.")
(Field and Clifford, JJ., dissenting); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,90 (1872) (noting that the Civil War
owed its existence to slavery).
25 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1917) (stating that Thiteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments "have become an integral part of that instrument, equally binding upon all the states and fixing
certain fundamental rights which all are bound to respect.").
26 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. Section Iof the Thirteenth Amendment provides: "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." id. § 1.
The Thirteenth Amendment not only authorized Congress to outlaw all forms of slavery and involuntary
servitude, but also to eradicate the last vestiges and incidents of slavery by securing to every race and color, "the
same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell
and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883). The
Thirteenth Amendment "is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an
absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States." Id. at
20 (holding that by its own unaided force and effect the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and
"established universal freedom").
27 U.S. CONST. amend XVI; see also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 79 (1917) (holding that the
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the discretion to
determine the enforcement mechanism to prohibit discrimination by the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. 30 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
enacted subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 When
Congress considered enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the commonly held
perception that the plight of southern blacks was not resolved by the adoption of
the Thirteenth Amendment was growing.32 Individual southern States had
enacted the "Black Codes, 3 3 which did not technically resurrect slavery, but
were viewed by the Republican Congress as a large step in that backward
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted so that people of color could acquire property without state legislation
discriminating against them solely because of their race).
28
See id. at 76 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to race). In Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879), the Supreme Court held:
The Fourteenth Amendment makes no attempt to enumerate the rights it designed to protect. It
speaks in general terms, and those are as comprehensive as possible. Its language is prohibitory; but
every prohibition implies the existence of rights and immunities, prominent among which is an
immunity from inequality of legal protection, either for life, liberty, or property. Any state action
that denies this immunity to a colored man is in conflict with the Constitution.
Id. at 310. See, e.g., Schneider v. Bahler, 564 F.Supp. 1449, 1455-56 (N.D. Ind. 1983) ("It is quite correct that
it is possible for persons of the white race to state a claim for racial discrimination under § 1982."); Hollander v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F.Supp. 90, 95 n.4 (Conn. 1975) ("As Congress clearly has the power to protect
whites from involuntary servitude and slavery, there can be little doubt that it also has the power to protect
whites from 'all badges and incidents of slavery."').
29
See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
3o
See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) (relating Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Congress has various constitutional powers to enact legislation to eliminate racial discrimination. See generally
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (detailing Congress' power to eliminate discrimination under the
Commerce Clause); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (discussing the Thirteenth Amendment's grant
of power to Congress' to eliminate racial discrimination); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)
(describing Congress' power to eliminate racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (describing Congress' power to eliminate racial discrimination
under the Fifteenth Amendment).
31
See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,31 n.7 (1948). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted on
April 9, 1866. It was originally passed under Congress' enforcement powers pursuant to the Thirteenth
Amendment and was re-enacted after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 78.
The Fourteenth Amendment passed the House of Representatives on June 13, 1866 and the Senate on June 8,
1966. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148-49, 3042 (1866). One of the primary purposes for many
members of Congress in supporting the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate the
guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 & 2459
(1866) (comments of Reps. Thayer & Stevens)
32
See Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100, 131-32 (1981) (White, J., concurring) (quoting S. EXEC.
Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 38 (1865)) (relating the history of the Civil Rights Act). President Andrew
Johnson had assigned Major General Carl Schurz the task of traveling through several Southern States to gather
information and make observations of postwar conditions found in that region. The Schurz report was
concerned that the South's loyalty to the Union would be questionable if it was permitted to rebuild based upon
another "peculiar institution" that conflicted with the fundamental principles of the nation's political system. S.
EXEC. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1865).
33
For a description and compilation of the "Black Codes," see generally E. MCPHERSON, THE
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 29-44
(1871).
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direction.34 Congress also found evidence that the white majority subjected
former slaves to serious abuses. 35 The "Black Codes" precluded blacks from,
among other things, owning property and residing in certain areas.36 The "Black
Codes" even had counterparts in some northern states.37 The Civil Rights Act of
1866 was specifically designed to overturn this oppression.38 "The plain object
of these statutes, as of the Constitution which authorized them, was to place the
colored race, in respect of civil rights, upon a level with whites. 3 9 Consequently, allowing African-Americans to buy and sell real property removed one
of many badges of slavery. 4°
Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 186641 addresses the property
rights of citizens. 42 Section 1982 provides in pertinent part:
3
See Green, 451 U.S. at 132 (citing H. FLACK, ADOPTION OFTHE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 11-54
(1908)) (relating the history of the Black Codes).
35
See id. (citing the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., xvii
(1866)) (relating the history of the Black Codes).
36
See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656,672 & n.2 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Before the Thirteenth Amendment, slaves could not own property, and after
emancipation the southern states enacted Black Codes to perpetuate this disability. This was the 'incident of
slavery' which the 1866 statute was aimed at, relying for its enforcement on the Thirteenth Amendment.")
(quoting B. SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1835-1877 193
(1973) and H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 319 (1982)).
37
See Goodman, 482 U.S. atn.36. The Northern counterparts of the "Black Codes" usually prohibited
African-Americans from moving into the state, imposed Jim Crow in public facilities, or prohibited AfricanAmericans from voting. Id. (quoting H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 36, at 320).
38
See, e.g., General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386 (1982) ("The
principal object of the legislation was to eradicate the Black Codes, laws enacted by Southern legislatures
imposing a range of civil disabilities on freedmen.").
39
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
40
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,444 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing
various badges of slavery).
41
42 U.S.C. § 1982. Section 1982 is patterned after Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
which provides:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
Id.
Because Sections 1981 and 1982 were derived from Section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and their
wording and legislative histories are identical, courts construe them similarly. See generally Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 171-73 (1976); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 440
(1973) (same). In contrast, Section 1983 has been construed differently. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co., 482 U.S. 656, 676 n.8 (1987) (discussing the unsettled law in the Third and other Circuits regarding the
statute of limitations in § 1983 cases, despite clear precedent regarding the statute of limitations in § 1981 and §
1982 cases).
42
In addition to Section 1982, Congress also enacted: 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which protects the right of all
citizens to enter into and enforce contracts; 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which protects people from conspiracies to
deprive people of color of "the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws; 42 U.S.C. § 1994, which prohibits peonage; and 18 U.S.C. § 1581 which provides for criminal
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All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.

Section 1982 was specifically designed to prevent an individual from being
denied the opportunity to purchase a home solely because of the individual's
race or color.43 Section 1982 guaranteed that "a dollar in the hands of a Negro
will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man."44 In Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court concluded that Section 1982 was
authorized by the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, and based
upon its legislative history, prohibited private discrimination.4 5
B. Federal Regulation of Mortgage Redlining
1. The FairHousing Act and Redlining
Section 1982 is not a comprehensive housing law because it deals only
with discrimination based upon race. 6 In contrast, the Fair Housing Act
(FHA)47 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race,
punishment of individuals who impose conditions of peonage on any person. Peonage is a form of involuntary
servitude. Taylor v. Georgia 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942).
43
For example, in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,34 (1948), white citizens agreed to exclude AfricanAmericans from a residential area by including a restrictive covenant that precluded them from renting, leasing,
selling, transferring or conveying their property to any person of color. Id. The white property owners went to
federal court to get an injunction to enforce the agreement. Id. The Court held that the federal courts could not
enforce a restrictive covenant that would violate the Constitution. Id; see also Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668
(1927) (invalidating a New Orleans ordinance that gave legal force to private discrimination by forbidding
people of color from establishing a home in a white community, or any white person from establish a home in a
black community); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 12 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory
restrictive covenant violated Fourteenth Amendment).
44
Jones, 392 U.S. at 443.
45
Section 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment differ significantly from the Fourteenth Amendment in
that the Fourteenth Amendment, as implemented by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, prohibits only official action taken under
color of state law. Section 1982, however, is directly applicable to private parties. Memphis v. Greene, 451
U.S. 100, 119-20 (1981); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[A] person may be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §
1982 by a private person acting completely independently of state government."); District of Columbia v.
Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 442 (1973) (stating that Section 1982 is "an 'absolute' bar to all such discrimination,
private as well as public, federal as well as state").
46
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (describing 42 U.S.C. § 1982). In
addition, Section 1982 does not specifically address discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling, prohibit advertising or other representations that indicate
discriminatory preferences, refer explicitly to discrimination in financing arrangements or in the provision of
brokerage services, and does not empower a federal administrative agency to assist aggrieved parties and makes
no provision enforcement by the Attorney General. Id. at 413-14. Nevertheless, Section 1982 does not
preclude a court from fashioning an effective equitable remedy. Id. at 414 n.3. A remedy enforcing a federal
right is available in the state court if that court is empowered to grant injunctive relief generally. Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238 (1969).
47
42 U.S.C. § 3601 [hereinafter FHA].
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color, religion, sex, and national origin.48 The preparatory language of the Act
states: "It is the policy of the United States to provide, within Constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States. ' '49 The FHA was
promulgated under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment.5 0 The FHA was
enacted in part because only private litigants could enforce Section 1982.
Congress was concerned that, notwithstanding the ability of private citizens to
enforce Section 1982, Congress still needed to enact a mechanism whereby the
federal government could enforce equal housing rights.5 '
Enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,52 the FHA seeks to
eliminate racial discrimination in the sale, renting, or financing of homes.5 3
More specifically, Section 3604 of the FHA prohibits discrimination in refusing
to sell or rent or refusing to negotiate with an individual because of any protected
class status, among other things.54 The FHA also forbids the making, printing,
or publishing of any notice or advertisement that indicates a preference for any
particular protected class member.55 The FHA also prohibits individuals from
inducing any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representing that a particular
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin will enter the neighborhood.5 6
Essentially, the FHA is designed to ensure that individuals are not denied the
right to live where they choose because of discriminatory reasons.57 Thus, the
48
Similar to Section 1981, a white individual can file a lawsuit for violations of the FHA. See, e.g.,
Trafficantev. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (white tenant of apartment complex has standing
under the FHA to challenge his landlord's racially discriminatory practices); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (white residents have standing under the FHA to challenge racial steering
occurring in their neighborhood).
49
42 U.S.C. § 3601.
50
See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 1972) (noting the basis for the FHA).
51
See id. at 415-16 (relaying Congressional concerns).
52
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, tit. VIII Fair Housing, § 801-19, 82 STAT. 81-89

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000)).
53

Id.

See id § 3604(a) (declaring it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer,
or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin").
55
Id. § 3604(c).
56
See id. § 3604(e). The First Amendment protects an individual who files a lawsuit or otherwise
publicly speaks about a neighbor, even if that conduct is motivated by discriminatory animus. See, e.g., White
v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1232-37 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that First Amendment protected neighbors from FHA
investigation unless they threatened imminent lawless action or filed objectively baseless lawsuits); Advocacy
Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. v. Woodland Estates Ass'n, 192 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1350 (M.D. Fla.
2002) (holding no First Amendment protection for a frivolous lawsuit). See also United States v. Wagner,940
F.Supp. 972, 980 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (finding that First Amendment protections do not extend to suits with
discriminatory intent that lack a sound legal basis); Michigan Protection Servs. v. Babin, 799 F.Supp. 695, 71722 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd on othergrounds, 18 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1994) (interpreting § 3604 to apply only to
owners and their agents, and that free speech protections apply absent a clear and present danger).
57
See Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1209-10
(7th Cir. 1984) (defining racial steering as the practice of directing homebuyers away from certain locations for
the purpose of maintaining patterns of segregation); Heights Cmty. Cong. v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135,
139-40 (6th Cir. 1985) (approving the definition of racial steering given in Southend) (citing Havens Realty
54
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FHA addresses problems58 of housing availability, but does not address problems
of housing habitability.
Although the FHA was designed to proscribe various discriminatory
practices in the housing and real estate markets, courts have expanded the reach
of the FHA, concluding that actions not specifically proscribed in Section 3604
can violate the FHA if they have the effect of making housing unavailable based
on a person's protected class status. 59 On its face, the FHA may be considered a
useful tool in housing discrimination cases.6 The FHA, as originally drafted,
however, was ineffective at preventing housing discrimination because the
federal enforcement mechanisms were limited.6' It has been observed that
passage of the FHA was the "result of a political compromise, a product more of
the desire for62passage than a desire for a rational scheme for uprooting discrimination."
Administrative responsibility for the FHA resides with the Secretary of
63
Housing and Urban Development.63 The Secretary
is only empowered 64 to pursue complaints by informal methods of conference, cooperation, conciliation,
and persuasion. 65 Because of these weak enforcement mechanisms, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) may not initiate
lawsuits or request a federal court to issue an injunction or restraining order. 6
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1982)); Hamad v. Woodcrest Condominium Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224,
233 (6th Cir. 2003) (summing up the state of current law regarding racial steering).
58
See Clifton Terrace Assocs. v. United Technologies Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(finding no cause of action against residential maintenance company, as FHA reaches "only discrimination that
adversely affects the availability of housing"); see also Southend, 743 F.2d at 1210 (stating that the FHA does
not protect "intangible interests in... already-owned property").
59
See, e.g., United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 573 (6th Ci. 1981) (finding that cities count
as persons in regard to the FHA); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that
in order to establish a primafacie case of housing discrimination, a party must establish: (1) that they are
members of a protected class; (2) that they sought and were qualified to rent or purchase the housing; (3) that
they were rejected; and (4) that the housing opportunity remained available to other renters or purchasers);
United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that city zoning laws count as
discrimination under the terms of the FHA if their effect unfairly burdens a protected class); United States v.
American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F.Supp. 1072, 1072-79 (N.D. M11.1977) (discovering that
property valuations based in part upon race serve to discriminate in housing under the FHA); see also Mitchell
v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming the test articulated in Robinson); Mencer v. Princeton
Square Apartments, 228 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2000) (same).
60
See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
61 See Joseph D. Rich, Enforcement of the FairHousing Act, As Amended, by the Department of
Justice, 46 BUS. LAw 1335, 1335 (1995) (documenting the early failures of the Federal Government to
successfully implement the FHA). For a summary of the behind-the-scenes machinations in the Senate, see
generally Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, FairHousing: A Legislative History and Perspective,8 WASHBURN L.J.
149 (1969).
62 Note, Discriminationin Employment and Housing: PrivateEnforcement of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 1968, 82 HARV. L. REv. 834, 835 (1969).
63
See 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2000) (establishing the administrators of the Fair Housing Act).
6
See id. § 3608(c) (2000) (defining the powers of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development).
65
See id. § 3608(e) (2000) (outlining the duties of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development).
6
See John H. Gilmore, Note, Insurance Redlining and the FairHousing Act: The Lost Opportunity
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Complaints of housing discrimination are addressed either because: (1) HUD
conducts an investigation and seeks a conciliation of the housing discrimination
complaint, or (2) the aggrieved party files a lawsuit alleging a violation of the
FHA.
The Secretary may refer the case to the Justice Department only when
the violation involves "a pattern or practice" of discrimination. 67 The Justice
Department is also authorized to pursue violators if the denial of the individual's
federal rights raises an issue of "general public importance. ''68 If the Justice
Department files a lawsuit on behalf of aggrieved individuals, a court may award
the identical relief that could be granted in a private enforcement action,
including actual and punitive damages. 69 If a state agency enforces rights and
ofMackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies, 34 CATH.U. L. REv. 563, 574-75 (1985) (summing up the
hamstrung enforcement provisions of the FHA); see also Charles M. Lamb, Congress, the Courts and Civil
Rights: The Fair Housing Act of 1968 Revisited, 27 ViLL. L. REV. 1115, 1116-27 & 1133-34 (1982)
(analyzing the shortcomings of the FHA enforcement provisions).
67
42 U.S.C. §§ 3611 (g) & 3614(a) (2000). The phrase "pattern or practice" is intended to encompass
more than an "isolated or accidental or peculiar event." See Hearingon H.R. 10327 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary,86th Cong. 13 (1960) (statement of Deputy Attorney General Walsh) (asserting that a "pattern or
practice" exists when the discrimination is part of the regular procedure or the usual situation); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 217 (4th Cir. 1972) (explaining that the phrase "pattern or practice" connotes intentional,
regular, or repeated violations of the rights granted by the FHA); United States v. Ramsey, 331 F.2d 824, 837
(5th Cir. 1964) (noting that the number of violations is not determinative); United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 123 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the FHA is also intended to reach the illegal
activities of a group of individuals even if the individual members of the group are not engaged in an
"individual pattern or practice" of housing discrimination).
68
42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2000). Congress intended that a case of "general public importance" is one
where "the points of law involved in it are of major significance or... the particular decision will constitute a
precedent for a large number of establishments .. " Hunter,459 F.2d at 217 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 12713
(daily ed. June 4, 1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
69 See United States v. Scott, 809 F.Supp. 1404, 1406 (D. Kan. 1992) (explaining that 42 U.S.C. §
3612(o)(3) (2000) provides for the identical remedies for private enforcement contained in 42 U.S.C. § 3613).
Some Circuits have held that a court may not presume emotional distress damages as a result of housing
discrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 931 (7th Cit. 1992) (stating that emotional
distress damages do not automatically attach to housing discrimination). If a plaintiff seeks damages for
emotional distress caused by the housing discrimination, the plaintiff need not submit medical or other similar
empirical evidence of emotional distress. See generally Morgan v. Sec'y of HUD, 985 F.2d 1451, 1459 (10th
Cir. 1993) (noting that damages from emotional distress may be inferred from circumstances beyond the
ordinary, in addition to being proven by testimony); Balistrieri,981 F.2d at 931-32 (awarding damages to black
testers who posed as apartment seekers although testers' testimony regarding emotional distress was somewhat
general and conclusory); Baumgardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming emotional distress
damages when the only evidence was plaintiff's own testimony regarding the incident's emotional impact). In
addition, emotional distress damages need not be amenable to precise calculation. Id.
Similarly, punitive damages are not automatically awarded in housing discrimination cases. The
defendant must have acted wantonly and maliciously and in willful disregard of the plaintiffs rights. See Marr
v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 744 (6th Cir. 1974) (awarding punitive damages to plaintiff where defendant willfully
disregarded plaintiffs right to freedom from housing discrimination). Pursuant to the federal civil rights
punitive damages statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a(b), these terms generally mean that the person had knowledge that
he was acting in violation of federal law. Cf.Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir.
1998) (requiring in practice a heightened standard of conduct more egregious than intentional discrimination to
support an award of punitive damages in Title VII cases); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, 85 F.3d 1211, 1216 (6th
Ci. 1996) (same). The court may also, in its discretion, award attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party,
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remedies that are substantially similar to the FHA, then HUD must refer the
complaint to the local agency.7 ° Claims are often misplaced and neglected
because of the administrative bureaucracy. 7' Because of inadequate enforcement
mechanisms, the FHA is an ineffective legislative scheme to prevent housing
discrimination.72
Despite the enactment of the FHA, "more than half of African
Americans and Latinos seeking to rent7 3or buy a home are treated differently than
whites with the same qualifications.'
2. Other FederalActs ProhibitingRedlining

In addition to the FHA, Congress has enacted other civil rights statues
that address specific problems of borrowers experiencing discrimination in the
extending of credit and granting of home loans. Congress found "that depository
institutions have sometimes contributed to the decline of certain geographic areas
.. . [because they failed] to provide adequate home financing to qualified
applicants on reasonable terms and conditions. 7 4 In 1975, Congress enacted the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), 75 so that information can be compiled
to determine whether depository institutions were serving the housing needs of
the communities and neighborhoods where they were located. 76 The HMDA
authorizes enforcement against banks by the Comptroller of the Currency.7 7

other than the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p) (2000). For a discussion of attorneys' fee awards, see
generally Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Award ofAttorney's Fees to PrevailingPartiesin Actions UnderFair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c)(2), 159 A.L.R. FED. 279 (2000). The court can also award injunctive
relief. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3614(d)(1)(A), 3602(i), 3613(a), 3613(c)(1) (2000) (authorizing a court to grant
injunctive relief if party brings lawsuit based upon a practice that has occurred or is about to occur).
70
See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (2000) (providing for local agency referral of housing discrimination claims
if a local agency is in place).
71
See Gilmore, supra note 66, at 575 (highlighting the inefficiency of administrative bureaucracy
within the claims processing arena).
72
Id.
73
Presidential Memorandum: Federal Leadership of Fair Housing, 59 Fed. Reg. 8513, 8513 (Jan. 17,
1994) (discussing the pervasiveness of residential segregation, describing the barriers between whites and
minorities in terms of home ownership and issuing Executive Order 12,892 to attempt to remedy past and
current racial discrimination in housing availability).
74
12 U.S.C. § 2801(a) (2000).
75
12 U.S.C. § 2801.
76
See 12 U.S.C. § 2801(b) (2000) (establishing that the purpose of §2801 is to "provide citizens...
with sufficient information to enable them to determine whether depository institutions are fulfilling their
obligations to serve the housing needs of communities and neighborhoods"). Originally, the HMDA expired on
June 28, 1980 by it own terms. See 12 U.S.C. § 2809, Pub.L. 94-200, Title III, § 310, Dec. 31, 1975, 89 Stat.
1128. The old self-termination provision, 12 U.S.C. § 2809, was repealed by Pub.L. 96-399, Title IR1§ 340(b),
Oct. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1658.
77
See 12 U.S.C. § 2804(b)(l)(A) (2000) (cataloging the agencies bound by the provisions of 12 U.S.C.
§ 2801 and against whom enforcement can be sought).
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Congress also enacted the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977,78
which requires the appropriate federal supervisory agency "to assess an institution' s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community," including low
and moderate income neighborhoods.79 Congress also enacted The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA). 80 ECOA makes it "unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction,
•.. on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or

age.",8' The purpose of ECOA is "to promote the availability of credit to all
82
creditworthy applicants without regard to [their protected-class status] .... ',
ECOA does not simply protect applicants who were rejected, but also prohibits
discrimination regarding the terms of credit, including the refusal to increase the
credit limit or the unfavorable modification of terms.83 Like the FHA, ECOA
provides for a private right-of-action. 84 If the same discriminatory act constitutes
a violation of both ECOA and state law, "the aggrieved party must elect to
proceed under either ECOA or state law. 8 5 ECOA has
been described as an
86
example of where federal and state regulation co-exist.
In 1994, Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act of 1994 ("HOEPA").87 HOEPA amended the Truth in Lending Act
12 U.S.C. § 2901.
12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (2000).
so 15 U.S.C. § 1691. To establish aprimafaciecase of a violation of ECOA, a plaintiff must show:
(1)that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he applied for credit from the defendant; (3) that he was
qualified for the credit; and (4) that the credit application was denied despite his qualifications. Mays v.
Buckeye Rural Elec. Coop., 277 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2002). Because of the similar purposes of ECOA and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000, courts have utilized the burden-allocation system of
federal employment discrimination cases as an analytical framework for claims of credit discrimination. Id. at
876. See also Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135 F.3d 389, 406 (6th Cir. 1998) (evaluating the legislative history
supporting the application of the Title VII burden-shifting framework to ECOA); Rosa v. Park West Bank &
Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Title VII burden-shifting to an ECOA discrimination
claim). But see Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Ci. 1998) (refusing to apply
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to ECOA cases).
81
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2000).
82
12 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (2000). ECOA was specifically enacted to eradicate credit discrimination against
78

79

women, especially married women because creditors traditionally refused to consider married women for individual
credit. See Mays, 277 F.3d at 876 (setting out the test necessary to establish aprinafaciecase under the ECOA);
Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274,1277 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605
F.2d 566,569 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (discussing the original purposes of the ECOA).
83
See Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F.Supp.2d 7, 23 (D.D.C. 2000) (pointing out that
the inclusion of the language "any aspect of a credit transacton" in 15 U.S.C. § 1691 supports a finding that
extensions of credit, modifications of terms and other matters qualify under ECOA); see also 12 C.F.R. §
202.2(m) (2000) (defining credit transaction to include terms, negotiations, and assumption of credit).
84
See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d) (2000) (defining and clarifying the reasons for adverse actions against
creditors).
8
Nat'l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 984 (3d Cir. 1980).
9
Nat'l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981,984 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f) and stating
that the "Equal Credit Opportunity Act, therefore, is an example of a situation where federal and state regulation
co-exist").
87
Home Ownership Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000)).
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("TILA")88 and added new disclosure requirements and consumer protection
restrictions for certain home mortgage loans. Congress enacted HOEPA, in part,
to restrict the practice of "reverse redlining" where lenders made high cost
mortgage loans to individuals from certain geographical areas without regard to
income and cash flow.8 9 For example, HOEPA proscribed "equity stripping" a
method of property acquisition that occurs when a lender issues a loan designed
to fail so that the lender could profit by acquiring the property through default,
rather than by receiving loan payments. 90 An assignee of a HOEPA loan can
also be liable for the original mortgage creditor's violations. 91 Remedies
available for a HOEPA violation include: (1) termination of the creditor's
security interest; (2) statutory damages if the lender fails to properly respond to a
rescission demand; (3) a penalty that at a minimum allows the borrower to
recoup the remaining unsecured claim based upon the original TILA disclosure
violations; (4) elimination of all finance charges; (5) if equitable, elimination of
the borrower's entire obligation to the lender; (6) recovery92of all payments made;
and (7) recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees and CoStS.
A. FederalRegulation of Insurance Redlining.
The previous section discussed what is typically termed "mortgage
redlining." It is clear that "mortgage redlining" is prohibited by the FHA.93
"Mortgage redlining," however, is not the only type of discrimination forbidden

88
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-1665 (2000)).
89
See Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.D.C. 2000) (describing the
purpose of HOEPA and defining reverse redlining). To qualify as a "HOEPA loan," the loan must satisfy five
requirements: (1) the loan must be a "consumer credit transaction"; (2) the loan must be a consumer credit
transaction with a "creditor"; (3) the loan must be secured by the "consumer's principal dwelling"; (4) the loan
must be a second or subordinate residential mortgage, not a "residential mortgage transaction," a "reverse
mortgage transaction," or a transaction under an "open credit plan"; and (5) either the annual percentage rate of
interest for the loan transaction exceeds certain levels or the total "points and fees" payable by the borrower at or
before closing will exceed the greater of 8% of the total loan amount, or $400. See alsoLopez v. Delta Funding
Corp., 1998 WL 1537755 *5 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing various provisions of HOEPA).
90 See, e.g., Hargraves,140 F. Supp. at 20-21 (considering predatory lending practices under HOEPA
legislation).
91 See In re Rodrigues, 278 B.R. 683, 688 (Bankr. D. R.I. 2002) ("[A]ssignees of High Cost
Mortgages are subject to all claims and defenses, whether under Truth In Lending or other law, that could be
raised against the original lender."); see also In re Murray, 239 B.R. 728,733 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing the
due diligence requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)). The due diligence requirement of HOEPA, section
1641(d), places the burden on the mortgage assignee to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
assignee could not reasonably determine, could not determine, or did not know that the loan was a HOEPA
loan. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d) (2000).
92
In re Murray, 239 B.R. at 733 (describing the remedies available to debtors that had a valid
recession of their loans resisted by their lenders).
93 See Laufman v. Oalldey Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489,493 (D.C Ohio 1976) (relying upon
42 U.S.C. § 3605 for the proposition that mortgage redlining is prohibited by the FHA).
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by the FHA. 94 Insurance can also prevent individuals from acquiring property.
Because insurance is a precondition to adequate housing, a discriminatory denial
of insurance may prevent a financially-capable individual from purchasing a
home.9 5 Buyers who can pay cash for the full purchase price of property are a
rare exception and an individual cannot purchase a home without securing
property insurance because mortgage companies require borrowers to insure the
property.96 The buyer's failure to maintain a homeowner's insurance policy
constitutes a default of the mortgage obligations.97 Consequently, an insurance
carrier's denial of homeowner's insurance effectively prevents the buyer from
98
purchasing the home.
Prior to the enactment of the FHA, riots and civil disturbances of the
1960's resulted in the appointment of the National Advisory Panel on Insurance
in Riot-Affected Areas. 99 The Advisory Panel examined the causes and effects
94
The FHA also prohibits other types of discrimination that directly affect the availability of housing to
minorities. See, e.g., DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996) (analyzing a hostile environment
sex discrimination claim under the FHA where a landlord sexually harrassed the tenant); Honce v. Vigil, I F.3d
1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993) (examining gender-based discrimination in rental of dwelling under the FHA);
Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 722 (1lth Cir. 1991) (alleging violation of civil rights under the
FHA where neighbors attempted to prevent plaintiff from selling his home to a minority purchaser); United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1184 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that the City engaged in a pattern
and practice of confining subsidized housing to minority areas which intentionally enhanced racial segregation
in violation of the FHA); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (challenging
discriminatory rental decisions in violation of the FHA ); Smith v. Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir.
1982) (holding that a town's racially-motivated decision to withdraw from multi-municipality low-income
housing authority violated the FHA); United States v. Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that a
city's rejection of public and low-income housing and adoption of restrictive land use ordinances violated the
FHA); Marable v. H. Walker, 644 F.2d 390, 397 (5th Cir. 1981) (prohibiting landlord's discriminatory
application of rental criteria); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294
(7th Cir. 1977) (finding Village had an obligation under the FHA to not implement zoning policies that
effectively prevented the construction of low-cost housing); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th
Cir. 1978) (affirming that racial steering of blacks tenants to a particular section of apartment complex violated
the FHA); United States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 422 F.Supp. 1072, 1076 (N.D. ll. 1977)
(assigning lower appraisal values to homes in racially integrated neighborhoods); United Farmworkers of Fla.
Hous. Project, Inc. v. Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 811 (5th Cir. 1974) (alleging city's refusal to permit
proposed housing project's connection to municipal sewage treatment was racially discriminatory under the
FHA); United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F.Supp. 544, 551 (W.D.Va. 1975) (rejecting a
noncommercial orphanage of minority orphans); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(prohibiting the recorder of deeds from accepting for filing instruments that contain racially restrictive
covenants); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1970)
(alleging City had deliberately rezoned property that plaintiffs had selected for low-income and minority family
housing in violation of the FHA).
Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F.Supp. 1106, 1109 (S.D. Ohio 1979)
("Since a discriminatory denial of financing violates [the Fair Housing Act], a discriminatory failure or refusal
to provide property insurance on dwellings must also violate [the Fair Housing Act].").
96
See United Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Human Relations Comm'n, 859 F.Supp. 323,328
(N.D. Ind. 1993) (citing JOHN P. WIEDEMER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 89-90 (1990)) (describing the impact a
lack of insurance will have on a potential homebuyers ability to secure financing).
97
See id. (describing the effect of a lapsed homeowner's insurance policy on the mortgage contract).
9s
For a discussion of insurance redlining on the Internet, see generally Gary A. Hernandez et al.,
Insurance Weblining & UnfairDiscriminationin Cyberspace,54 SMU L REV. 1953 (Fall 2001).
99 See Badain, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining the events leading up to the creation of the Hughes Panel).
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of inner city insurance unavailability and devised a solution.' °° Although riots
were one factor resulting in insurance unavailability, the Panel documented
"[w]idespread refusals to insure .. even where there had been no riots and
where none were threatened. These were based primarily upon neighborhood
characteristics, most significantly racial composition, without regard to the merits
of the particular risk." 101 In addition, during this period of civil disturbances, the
insurance industry exaggerated losses and incorporated that exaggerated risk into
10 2
its underwriting policies.
The Advisory Panel predicted there would be "white flight" from urban
areas affected by the riots and also predicted that remaining residents would less
likely purchase insurance unless affordable insurance-was available. 0 3 Further,
the Panel found that inner city business owners and residents were either
uninsured or underinsured.°4 The Advisory Panel aptly described the impact of
insurance on housing as follows:
Insurance is essential to revitalize our cities. It is a cornerstone of
credit. Without insurance, banks and other financial institutions will
not and cannot make loans. New housing cannot be constructed and
existing housing cannot be repaired. New business cannot0 5be opened
and existing businesses cannot expand, or even survive.1
Because the Advisory Panel believed that the main cause of insurance
unavailability was the fear of catastrophic loss due to rioting, the Panel recommended that the government provide guarantees so that insurance companies
would continue to provide basic property insurance. 1°6 As a result, the Panel
proposed that the federal government offer non-cancelable, low-cost riot

1o0 See PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADvISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE INRIOT-EFFECTED AREAS, MEETING
THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CrrEs 1 & 29 (1968) [hereinafter Hughes Panel].

101 Badain, supra note 5, at 6.
102 See Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (S.D. Ohio
1979) (explaining how the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 helped create two insurance
markets).
103 Hughes Panel, supra note 100, at 8 (outlining the findings of the President's National Advisory
Panel).
104 See Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1111 (listing some of the specific findings of the Advisory Panel).
105 See id. at 1111; see also NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297-98 (7th Cir.
1992) (summarizing plaintiff's argument that insurance redlining is proscribed by the FHA as: "No insurance,
no loan; no loan, no house; lack of insurance thus makes housing unavailable."); United States v. Mass. Indus.
Fin. Agency, 910 F. Supp. 21, 27 (D. Mass. 1996) ("Few if any, banks make home loans to uninsured
borrowers. Thus, property insurers in effect have the power to make housing unavailable to potential buyers.");
McDiarmid v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 604 F. Supp. 105, 107 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ("It is elementary that without
insurance, mortgage financing will be unavailable, because a mortgage lender simply will not lend money on the
property. Without mortgage financing, homes cannot be purchased.").
'06 See Hughes Panel, supra note 100, at 2-7 (describing unavailability of insurance in inner city
neighborhoods).
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insurance to companies that participated in a "Fair Access to Insurance
Requirements" (FAIR) plan. 107

Congress reacted by adopting the Urban Property Protection and
Reinsurance Act of 1968 ("UPPRA"), in the same year the FHA was enacted. °8
Congress enacted UPPRA to address the problem of the unavailability of hazard
insurance in some urban areas.' °9 However, the FAIR plan was at a higher rate
to that compared to the voluntary market.' 0 The purposes of the FHA and
UPPRA are different. UPPRA "was enacted to protect private insurance
companies from the risk of catastrophic losses which resulted from riots or civil
disorders" but did not "expressly address the issue of discriminatory insurance
redlining based on race.""' The riot reinsurance program terminated on
November 30, 1983.112
11. An Overview of State Regulatory Authority Which May Support a
Prohibitionof InsuranceRedlining

In addition to the FHA, state constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, and decisional law" 3 may restrict redlining. Such laws may regulate
housing, insurance, or discrimination in general. 14 Some states have enacted
constitutional provisions that impact insurance redlining or similar discrimina107

coverage).
108

See id. at 7-8 (making recommendations for creating affirmative programs to provide insurance
Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, PUB. L. 90-448, Title XI, 82 STAT. 555

(1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15 & 42 U.S.C.).
109
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1358 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining the
enactment of UPPRA).
110 See Badain, supra note 5, at 9 (describing the ultimate resolution of the tension between urban and
rural interest regarding the spreading of insurance costs).
III Id. (quoting Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F.Supp. 1106, 1111
(S.D.
Ohio 1979)).
112
See Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 452(a)(1), 97 Stat. 1230
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb(b)(1) (2000)).
113
Where a statute prohibits "unfair discrimination" but fails to explain what that means, it may be up
to the court to interpret what conduct is proscribed. See Lans v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 699 P.2d 1299,
1302 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he fact that other statutes specifically prohibit sex discrimination does not
mean that the use of sex as a classification in disability insurance cannot be unfair discrimination, or, put
anothiivay, is fair discrimination.").
See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.1209 (2008) (prohibiting termination of an insurance agent's
employment based on geographic location of the agent's insurance business or the agent's actual or expected
loss experience). At the same time, an insurance agent suing for wrongful termination typically does not have
standing under redlining statutes. See Novak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 599 N.W.2d 546, 555 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that insurance agents, who lost theirjobs allegedly due to the poor economic status of their
clients, cannot allege race discrimination under Civil Rights Act on behalf of their clients); see also R.J. Gaydos
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 773 A.2d 1132, 1147 (N.J. 2001) (finding that insurance agents
were not members of class protected by Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act, and thus, agent who alleged
wrongful termination because of high loss ratio of policies sold by him did not have private right of action under
Act).
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tion. For example, at least fourteen state constitutions have an Equal Rights
Amendment or comparable provisions banning discrimination based on sex or
other factors. 115 Such provisions may restrict state action, 1 6 including local
governments and school districts," 7 or they may extend to private persons,
businesses, and institutions. 18 These provisions have been used to strike down
sex-based restrictions on student housing," 9 and to justify an insurance
commissioner's disapproval of auto insurance rate differentials. 120 One could
argue that these constitutional provisions also regulate rate differentials in home
insurance or other restrictions based upon certain protected class statuses.
State housing laws may restrict redlining in both the sale 121 and rental
11
E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 3; COLO.CONST. art. 2, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 20; HAW.
CONST. art. 1, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18; MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 46; MASS. CONST. art. 1;
MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4; N.H. CONST. art. 2; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28; TEX. CONST.
Art. 1, § 3a; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1.
116 See, e.g., N.H. CONST. art. 2 ("All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights--among
which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a
word, of seeking and obtaining happiness. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
this state on account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin.").
117 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18 ("The equal protections of the laws shall not be denied or abridged
on account of sex by the State or its units of local governments and school districts.").
It See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4 ("The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution
shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex,
culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.").
119 See Texas Woman's Univ. v. Chayklintaste, 521 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), rev'd
on
othergrounds, 530 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1975) (holding that Texas Woman's University had unconstitutionally
discriminated against male students by not arranging on-campus housing for them although female students
enjoyed such accommodation; the Court further held that the University had also unconstitutionally
discriminated against female students by not granting them permission to live off-campus although male
students were granted this permission).
120 See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r of Commonwealth of Pa., 442 A.2d 382,
386
(Pa. 1982) (finding that the Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was acting within
his statutory authority and considered all actuarial factors when determining that an insurer was acting in an
"inherently unfairly discriminatory" manner by determining auto insurance rates based on the gender of the
applicants).
121 For state provisions that prohibit redlining, see, e.g., California Housing Financial Discrimination
Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35800 (2006) (describing the harmful effects of redlining and providing
for measures to prevent it); Michigan Mortgages Lending Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1601 (2008)
(prohibiting discrimination against borrowers on basis of "racial or ethnic characteristics or trends in the
neighborhoods in which the real estate is located."). For other examples of state sources prohibiting or
providing authority against redlining, see Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide MuL Ins. Ca,94 Ohio Misc. 2d
151 (Ohio Ct. C.P.1997) (holding that the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements Plan does not permit
redlining against homeowners who have been unable to secure insurance); see also C.T. Foster, Annotation,
Restrictive Covenants, Conditions,or Agreements in Respect ofReal PropertyDiscriminatingagainstPersons
on Account of Race, Color, or Religion,3 A.L.R.2d 466 (2006) (describing how state and federal courts have
struck down as unconstitutional, those state and local regulations that have imposed racial restrictions on the
purchase or occupancy of real estate).
For the question whether federal housing laws preempt state housing laws, see, e.g., Raija H. Bettauer,
Federaland StateAnti-Redlining Laws: Must NationalBanks Comply with Both?, 97 BANKING IJ.329 (Apr.
1980) (explaining that state laws do not apply to national banks if they are directly or indirectly inconsistent
with pertinent federal laws).
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contexts.1 22 Cities have also enacted ordinances banning discriminatory housing
practices. 23 State insurance statutes restrict redlining and similar discriminatory
practices by regulating differences in rates, 124 premiums, 125 coverage,126 services
or benefits under the policy, 127 rejection of an application for a policy, 28 refusal
to issue or renew a policy, 129 differences in sales commissions, 30 backdating of
policies, 13 deductibles, 132 and so forth. Other statutes prevent insurers from

offering a discount or rebate to one class of insureds while denying it to a
similarly situated class.133 Insureds must have direct contact with an insurer or
122

See generally Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Prohibition, Under State Civil Right Laws, of Racial

Discriminationin Rental of Privately Owned ResidentialProperty,96 A.L.R.3d 497 (2006) (describing how
state and federal courts have adjudicated on the validity of state civil rights laws that bar racial discrimination in
the rental of privately owned residential property).
123
See Porter v. Oberlin, 205 N.E.2d 363, 366 (1965) (holding that a city's police power included
power to prevent discrimination in sale/rental of housing on basis of race, creed, or color); see generally K.H.
Larsen, Annotation, Power of Municipal Corporationto Enact Civil Rights Ordinance, 93 A.L.R.2d 1028
(2006).
124 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10140-10145.4 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-488 (2007); MASS. GEN.
LAwS ch. 175, § 120 (2007); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2606(a)(1) (McKinney 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 737.310
(2007); S.C. CODE § 38-55-50 (2007); Wis. STAT. 625.11(4) (2008) ("One rate is unfairly discriminatory in
relation to another in the same class if it clearly fails to reflect equitably the differences in expected losses and
expenses."); see Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding violation of
California's Insurance Code and California Unruh Civil Rights Act where rating was not based on experience);
see also Int'l Patrol & Detective Agency, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 396 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
198 1) (holding that excessive rates were discriminatory); Ins. Comm'r for the State v. Engleman, 692 A.2d 474
(Md. 1997) ("Unfair discrimination, as the term is employed by the Insurance Code, means discrimination
among insureds of the same class based upon something other than actuarial risk.").
125
E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10140-10145.4 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-488 (2007); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 175, § 120 (2007); N.Y. INS. LAw § 2606(a)(1) (McKinney 2008); S.C. CODE § 38-55-50 (2007);
A.B. 387, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007); see also Anzinger v. O'Connor, 440 N.E.2d 1014 (111.App. Ct.
1982) (finding medical malpractice carrier's premiums were excessive and discriminatory against emergency
physicians); see generally 5 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 69:43 (3d ed.
2007) (describing the various methods by which insurers are barred from discriminating against the insured on
the basis of age, sex, residence, or handicap).
126 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10140-10145.4 (2006); A.B. 387, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007);
McCarter v. Glacier Gen. Assur. Co., 546 P.2d 249 (Mont. 1976) (finding that offset of coverage benefits by
amount paid by government insurance was discriminatory, where similarly situated insured received greater
coverage for same premium).
127 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10140-10145.4 (2006); S.C. CODE § 38-55-50 (2007); McCarter v. Glacier
Gen. Assur. Co., 546 P.2d 249 (Mont. 1976) (holding that violation of a statute occurred where insurer reduced
crop loss payments to insured farmer by proportion of loss paid under government crop insurance, while
similarly situated insured who did not have other insurance received full payment for loss).
128 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10140-10145.4 (2006); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2606(b)(1) (McKinney 2008).
129 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 675 (2006) (cancellation or failure to renew certain property insurance);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 2606(b)(2) (McKinney 2008); Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (finding that the
state commissioner of insurance could not summarily exclude all African Americans from state life insurance
program merely because of higher mortality rate of African Americans generally).
130 E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 2606(b)(3) (McKinney 2008).
131 See generally 5 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 69:43 (3d ed.
2007).
132 See Yourman v. People's Sec. Life Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 696, 699 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that
insured could bring an action against insurer for issuing a policy with an excessive deductible under New
Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA") but not under New Jersey's Law against Discrimination ("LAD")).
133 See Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 147 Cal. Rptr. 22,26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
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its agents in order to have standing to sue over redlining practices; it is not
enough that the individual is deterred from seeking insurance because of
knowledge of an insurer's redlining practices. 134
State statutes may prohibit discrimination based on various
classifications including race, color, creed, marital status, sex, national origin,
age, residence, disability, lawful occupation, and location of the risk. 35 States
(discussing good-faith in quoting insurance prices as it relates to unfair discrimination among policyholders by
charging different premiums or terms of coverage); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Gold, 795 So. 2d 119, 121 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding insurance policy invalid where it requires the holder of a group insurance policy to
apply a dividend, premium refund, rate reduction, commission, or service fee on a basis which precludes
individual selection and unfair discrimination); Katn v. Ins. Bureau, 505 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding constitutionality of state anti-rebate statutes); Comm'r of Ins. v. Jackson Prod. Credit Ass'n, 377 So.
2d 1047, 1052-53 (Miss. 1979) (holding that the Insurance Commissioner of Mississippi could not validly deny
the application of certain product credit association for incorporated insurance agency license when other
financially related services could obtain the same license); see generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation,
InsuranceAnti-rebate Statutes: Validity and Construction,90 A.L.R.4th 213 (2006) (explaining how state and
federal Courts have dealt with litigation related to the validity of state statutes that prohibit rebates in the
insurance industry). But see Assoc. Cal., Loggers Inc. v. Kinder, 168 Cal. Rptr. 67, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that there shall be no rebate where insureds provided administrative services to insurer in exchange for
reimbursement).
A legitimate, nondiscriminatory dividend is not considered an illegal rebate. See Keniston v. Am. Nat.
Ins. Co., 107 Cal. Rptr. 583, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that insurer was not liable to class action
plaintiffs since it did not charge excessive premiums or refund the lender based on lender's costs); see also W.
Wood Moulding & Millwork Producers, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 572 P.2d 1004, 1005 (Or. 1977) (holding
that California law allows insurers to permit premium rebates and payments of dividends by insurers under
certain circumstances).
134 See McClain v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 424 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that Article II
standing is proper only for those plaintiffs who had direct contact with the insurer or its authorized agent when
claiming that they were denied insurance on the basis of their minority status).
135 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1548(B) (2008) (prohibiting mortgage guaranty insurance
companies from discriminating on the basis of applicant's sex, age, marital status, creed, race, color, or national
origin when issuing or extending mortgage guaranty insurance); KAN. STAT. § 40-3510(a) (2006) (same);
MICH. COMP. LAws 500.2027 (2008) (same); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 1997 WL 182274 at *2-3 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 3, 1997) (concluding that insurer's limitation on AIDS coverage did not violate state statute that prohibited
discrimination against handicapped); Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exch. v. Comm'r of Ins., 326 N.W.2d 444,
447 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding fine for underwriting practice which restricted sale of automobile
insurance to those under age twenty-one); Williams v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 132 S.W.3d 244, 246 (Mo. 2004)
(finding violation of statute prohibiting discriminatory insurance practices on the basis of sex, where insurer
excluded coverage for loss or expense resulting from or caused by any disease or disorder of the prostate); see
also Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 829 F. Supp. 529, 541-42 (D.R.I. 1993) (finding no violation of Equal
Protection Clause of U.S. Constitution where university provided coverage for obstetrical and gynecological
expenses in effect subsidized by male students); see generallyFrancis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Proprietyof
Automobile Insurer's Policy of Refusing Insurance, or Requiring Advanced Rates, because of Age, Sex,
Residence, or Handicap,33 A.L.R.4th 523 (2006) (analyzing how state and federal courts have treated the
validity of automobile insurance companies denying insurance or increasing insurance premiums for customers
based on their age, sex, residence, or physical handicap). But see Abuzant v. Shelter Ins. Co., 977 S.W.2d 259,
261 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (finding no unlawful discrimination based on national origin, where automobile insurer
denied coverage to person of Palestinian descent but no evidence indicated insurer provided coverage to persons
of other national origin); Telles v. Comm'r of Ins., 574 N.E.2d 359, 360-61 (Mass. 1991) (holding that State
Insurance Commissioner did not have authority to prohibit life insurance underwriting which discriminated on
the basis of sex, because applicable statute allowed "fair" discrimination for groupings based on substantially
similar risks); Rochester Hosp. Serv. Corp. v. Div. of Human Rights of Exec. Dep't., 401 N.Y.S.2d 413,41617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (finding health insurance rates based in part on marital status not "unfairly
discriminatory").
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generally do not consider rate differences to be discriminatory if they are based
on sound actuarial principles or legitimate rating factors.' 36 In some cases,
however, even sound actuarial reasons are not enough to justify differences in
treatment. 37 Of course, insurance policies may provide different features or
benefits if premiums or similar elements are adjusted accordingly.' 38 A statute
may require a state agency to offer insurance to certain disadvantaged groups
that private insurers might refuse to cover. 139 A number of state regulations also
prohibit redlining or address related problems.'4°
If an insurer charges discriminatory or excessive rates, the insured may
be entitled to a rate refund.' 4' Courts tend to find that redlining statutes do not
136

N.Y. INS. LAW § 2606(d) (McKinney 2008) (requiring "sound underwriting and actuarial principles

reasonably related to actual or anticipated loss experience"); WIS. STAT. § 625.11(4) (2008) (stating that "[riates
are not unfairly discriminatory because different premiums result for policyholders with like loss exposures but
different expense factors, or like expense factors but different loss exposures, so long as the rates reflect the
differences with reasonable accuracy."). The Wisconsin statute further states that "[riates are not unfairly
discriminatory if they are averaged broadly among persons insured under a group, franchise or blanket policy."
See also Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that California Insurance
Code provision that allows denial of coverage so long as such denial is based on "sound actuarial principles" or
is related to "actual and reasonably anticipated experience" provides safe harbor from claim of unfair business
practices); Rogers v. Dep't. of Health &Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431,439 (4th Cir. 1999) (determining that the
State of South Carolina had not violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by providing long-term
disability until age sixty-five for employees with physical disabilities, but only for one year for those employees
with mental disabilities); Hogue v. United Olympic Life Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that
health insurance company was acting legally in dividing its policyholders into two separate groups based on
financial metrics such as their paid/loss ratios); Craner v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1234,
1242 (D. Utah 1998) (establishing that an insurer's decision to reject risk "must not be arbitrary or capricious,
and must be based upon and measured by objective standards, such as rules and standards set forth in NML's
Underwriting Manual"); El-Hajj v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D. Me. 2001) (requiring
coverage on same terms and conditions unless sound actuarial evidence justifies difference); British & Foreign
Marine Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 281 N.E.2d 149, 152 (N.Y. 1972) (upholding insurers' decisions to reduce business
and cancel policies in certain areas of New York, because such decisions were based on underwriting and
business reasons rather than racial hostility).
137 See Bartholomew ex rel. Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393, 398 (Pa. Commw. 1988) (finding
that actuarially sound rates based in part on driver's sex violated Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment).
138 See Jameson v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 415 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying a Louisiana
anti-discrimination statute to policies with different premiums, dividends, and reserve structures).
139 See State ex. rel. Human Res. Dev. & Employment, Inc. v. Bd. of Risk & Ins. Mgmt. of W. Va.,
2003 WL 22762065 (W. Va. 2003) (requiring State Board of Risk and Insurance Management to offer liability
policy to a non-profit agency which owned, operated, and managed apartment complexes to provide subsidized
housing for elderly, disabled, or low-income citizens).
140 See, e.g., Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4 § 85-2.010 (2008) (outlining specific criteria for business
firms' and neighborhood organizations' proposals for "Neighborhood Assistance Programs"); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, ch. IX, pt. 218 (prohibiting insurers "from engaging in redlining practices through
refusal to issue or renew, or from canceling policies based on the geographic location of the risk; or by
terminating or canceling contracts or accounts of agents or brokers based on their geographic location or the
geographic location of the risks or properties for which coverage is being provided by such producers"); WYO.
RuLEs & REGs., INS. GEN. ch. 33, § 2 (identifying specific acts or practices of unfair discrimination considered
to be insurance "redlining").
141 See Marshall Durbin Food Corp. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 834 F.2d 949, 950 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(upholding jury determination of retroactive rate refund); see also Int'l Patrol & Detective Agency, Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 396 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. App. 1981) (noting that the Department of Insurance may order a
refund where insurer charges excessive rates).
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grant a private right of action to the insured, however, leaving enforcement to the
state insurance commissioner or similar authority. 142 Courts will not void a
contract for insurance where there has been an illegal discrimination or rebate,
because this would allow the insurer to take advantage of its own wrong. 43 An
agreement to provide a discriminatory rebate, however, is often deemed
unenforceable. 144 Additionally, insurers, agents, brokers, and like parties who
violate redlining laws will
be sanctioned in various ways, usually by the
45
governing state agency.1

142 See N.A.A.C.P. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 302 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding there is no
private right of action in eth relevant statutes in the Wisconsin Fair Housing Act); El-Hajj v. Fortis Benefits Ins.
Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D. Me. 2001) (finding no private right of action under Maine law); Sparkes v.
Morrison & Foerster Long-Term Disability Plan, 129 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185-88 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding no
private right of action under New York insurance law); Dryden v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 737 F. Supp.
1058, 1064 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (finding no private right of action under the Unfair Competition Article of
Indiana's Insurance code); Perez ex rel. Perez v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 826, 834
(Tex. App. 2003) (concluding that violation of state insurance statute provided only administrative remedies that
insurance commissioner could initiate); Safie Enterprises, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 381 N.W.2d
747, 752 (Mich. App. 1985) (finding statute authorizing Commissioner of Insurance to investigate complaints
of refusing to insure or limiting coverage on basis of race, color, creed, marital status, sex, or national origin
does not create right a private cause of action against insurer); Retail Clerks Welfare Fund. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 176 A.2d 524, 526 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961) (holding that statutes regulating insurance trade
practices and forbidding unfair discrimination are not read into contracts of insurance to create a private cause
of action for breach of contract for individual policyholder). But see Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,
225 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining that a violation of Insurance Code's discrimination provisions
could form the basis for a private cause of action under separate unfair competition statute).
Courts are more amenable to finding a private right of action pursuant to a general civil rights statute, even
where the legislature has created an administrative agency to enforce the statute. See Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 338, 338-40 (Ohio C.P. 1993) (finding that African American
homeowners and prospective homeowners stated an actionable claim against insurer under Ohio Civil Rights
Act where the insurer allegedly "avoid[ed] writing insurance policies, charg[ed] different rates, offer[ed]
inferior policies, discourag[ed] applications, impos[ed] different terms and conditions of coverage, or
cancell[ed] or [failed to review] policies"); see generally Annotation, Recovery of Damages as Remedy for
Wrongful DiscriminationUnder State or Local Civil Rights Provisions,85 A.L.R.3d 351 (2006).
143 See Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Exec. Life Ins. Co., 147 Cal. Rptr. 22, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(citing 5 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 30:64, pp. 583-84 (2d ed. 1960)); Hyde Ins. Agency, Inc.
v. Dixie Leasing Corp., 215 S.E.2d 162, 165 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) ("[T]he insurer cannot say that the contract
of insurance is void because of a violation of an antirebate statute for the purpose of defeating the insured, and
thus take advantage of its own wrong."); see generally COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 69:47.
144
See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 613 P.2d 1275, 1281 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that
such an agreement would be unenforceable); Mountain Fir Lumber Co. v. Employee Benefit Ins. Co., 679 P.2d
296, 299 (Or. 1984) (explaining that the distinction between the terms "void" and "unenforceable" in the
contract setting is significant). In the contract setting, "void" often evokes overly broad connotations thus, for
example, rendering an agreement to have no legal effects. Id. "Unenforceable," on the other hand, may often
permit the victimized party to retain their legal benefits while prohibiting the insurer from benefiting from its
illegal actions.).
145 See, e.g., 18 DEL. CODE § 2304 (2006); see also Homestead Supplies, Inc., 147 Cal. Rptr. at 30
(1978) (explaining that "while administrative remedies and penalties are provided for an insurer's making an
unfair discrimination in rates. . . , no penalty or other sanction is imposed for the purchase or acceptance of a
policy the premium for which constitutes an unfair rate discrimination") (footnote omitted); Hyde Ins. Agency,
Inc., 215 S.E.2d at 165 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (noting that although the relevant statutes sanctions for insurers
for violations of the antirebate provisions, such statutes do not render the violative provisions void); see
generally Southern States Life Ins. Co. v. McCauley, 464 P.2d 404 (N.M. 1970) (holding generally that where
penalties for statutory violations exist, they are exclusive and courts do not have the right to impose other

14 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2008)
In addition to laws specifically dealing with insurance or housing, such
46
as those dealing with general consumer protection and unfair competition,
states may, though do not necessarily, restrict redlining through laws dealing
with general
laws against discrimination, 147 state civil rights statutes, 148 and other
9
14

laws.

Some state court rulings have been based upon the desire to avoid
insurance discrimination. For example, some courts have adopted the "filed rate
doctrine," which provides that any rate that has been approved by the governing
regulatory agency is "per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings
brought by ratepayers." 50 One purpose of this doctrine is to "avoid[] retroactive
relief that would lead to discrimination in rates such that a victorious plaintiff
would end up paying less than similarly situated nonsuing customers."' 51 In one
case, insureds could not recover a refund of homeowners and farm insurance
policy surcharges allegedly based on the age of the dwelling, where the insurer
52
had already satisfied the requirements of the state Department of Commerce. 1

penalties upon the parties).
146 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. § 59A-1-1 to 59-A-53-17 (1985) (prohibiting certain unfair
methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
790.03 (2002) (defining unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the
business of insurance).
147 See, e.g., Yourman v. People's Sec. Life Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 696, 704 (D.N.J. 1998) (applying
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 (1968) and finding that New Jersey's anti-discrimination laws were inapplicable to a
health insurer's alleged discrimination). In Yourman, the insurance company refused to issue a policy to an
insured with children suffering from cystic fibrosis unless she accepted a higher deductible than that issued to
other insureds without such sick children. Id. The court reasoned that an application of the anti-discrimination
law to the insurer would subject the insurance industry to a type of "multiple regulation" that would result in
conflict. Id.
148 See, e.g., Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 667, 669 (Ohio C.P.
1997) (challenging redlining through the Ohio Civil Rights Act); see also Annotation, Recovery ofDamagesas
Remedy for Wrongful DiscriminationUnder State orLocal Civil Rights Provisions,85 A.L.R.3d 351 (2006).
149 See generally Jane M. Draper, Annotation, State Civil Rights Legislation Prohibiting Sex
Discriminationin Housing, 81 A.L.R.4th 205 (2006); Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, What Constitutes Illegal
Discrimination Under State Statutory ProhibitionAgainst Discriminationin Housing Accommodations on
Account of MaritalStatus, 33 A.L.R.4th 964 (2006); Carol] J. Miller, Annotation, Constructionand Effect of
State Legislation ForbiddingDiscriminationin Housing on Account of PhysicalHandicap,28 A.L.R.4th 685
(2006); Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Validity and ConstructionofAnti-blockbusting RegulationsDesignedto
Prevent Brokers from Inducing Sales of Realty Because of Actual or Rumored Entry of Racial Group into
Neighborhood, 34 A.L.R.3d 1432 (2006); R.M. Garcia, Annotation, Suspension or Revocation of Real-estate
Broker's License on Ground of Discrimination,42 A.L.R.3d 1099 (2006).
150 Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1994); accord. Schermer v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 702 N.W.2d 898, 906 (Minn. App. 2005).
151 Schermer, 702 N.W.2d at 906.
152 Id. at 907.
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Ill. The Interface Between the FederalRegulatory Authority
Through the FHA and the State RegulatoryAuthority Through the
McCarran-FergusonAct

Whether the practice of "insurance redlining" that results in making
housing unavailable is proscribed within the meaning of Section 3604(a) of the
FHA is subject to more recent judicial activity. Although the FHA does not
expressly proscribe insurance redlining, some courts have held that the broad
language of Section 3604(a) and the legislative design of the FHA to eliminate
discrimination within the housing and real estate industries encompasses
"insurance redlining."' 153 Other courts have concluded otherwise. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, held that the FHA does not proscribe
insurance redlining because the Congress that enacted the FHA was not unaware
of the problem of the unavailability of hazard insurance in some urban areas, but
approached the issue differently by enacting the Urban Property Protection and
Reinsurance Act of 1968.154 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Congress could enact overlapping statutes that provide for relief for the
same wrong.155
The rationale of these cases is more specifically analyzed below. For a
better understanding of the legal analysis underpinning the courts rationale, it is
valuable at the outset to have a basic understanding of the history of insurance
56
regulation and the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 1
A. The McCarran-FergusonAct

In order to project future losses to establish accurate and appropriate
premiums, insurance companies began pooling prior-loss experience data which
57
allowed for carriers to set rates that were more aligned with predictive losses.
153 United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Human Relations Comm'n, 24 F.3d 1008, 1015 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding insurance redlining is prohibited by FHA); United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832,
835 (9th Cir. 1994) ("'Interference' ranges from racially motivated firebombings, to exclusionary zoning, and
insurance redlining.") (citations omitted); Michigan Protection & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337,
347 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); see also generally NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.
1992); Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (S.D. Ohio 1979)
(same); Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2002).
But see Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419,423-24 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the FHA does not
proscribe insurance redlining).
'-4 Mackey, 724 F.2d at 424. For a general discussion of the Urban Property Protection and
Reinsurance Act of 1968, see supra text accompanying notes 109-113.
155 See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding the same).
156 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1945). The operative portion of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides: "No
Act
of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance .... " 15 U.S.C. § 10 12(b).
157 See generallyGary Keith Nedrow, Comment, The McCarranAct's AntiTrust Exemption for "The
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Pooling resulted in the creation of state-licensed rating bureaus that provided loss
experience data to subscribing carriers.158 The rates and classifications of
policies were
subject to control by the States' Director or Commissioner of
59
Insurance. 1
State discrimination in favor of domestic insurers necessarily implicated
questions regarding the relevance of the Commerce Clause,' 60 which gives Congress authority to "regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce." 161 A
restriction implicit in the Commerce Clause, however, precludes States from
burdening the free flow of commerce.1 62 The Supreme Court has cited the
Commerce Clause as an example of a constitutional provision that authorizes
Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; but does not authorize
Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce. 163 As
early as 1868, foreign insurance carriers challenged state regulations as violative
of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 164 Originally, the
United States Supreme Court held in Paul v. Virginia that the business of
insurance was not conducted in interstate commerce and, therefore, the
Commerce Clause was inapplicable. 165 "Consequently, the regulation of
insurance transactions was thought to rest exclusively with the States."' 166 States
then had exclusive dominion over the insurance industry. 167
Following the Court's decision in Paul v. Virginia, Congress enacted
169
168
sweeping antitrust legislation, including the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 70 In analyzing the consequences of
Business oflnsurance": A Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN L. REV. 329,335-36(1976); Davis J. Howard, Uncle
Sam v. The Insurance Commissioners: A Multi-Level Approach To Defining The "BusinessOf Insurance"
Under The McCarran-FergusonAct, 25 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1, 21 (1989).
158 See generally Durham & Stegler, The Insurance Industry: A Case Study in the Workability of
Regulated Competition 107 U. PA. L. REV. 199, 204-11 (1958); Dominick Vetri, The Integrationof Tort Law
Making in The New Age, 66 OR. L. REV. 277 (1987).
159 See generally, e.g., Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 1981).
160 U.S. CONST, art. 1. § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the Power ... To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .
.
161
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
162 See generally Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 462 (1978).
163 See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
164 See generally Howard, supra note 157, at 20.
165 See generally 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868); Kevin J. McKeon, Insurance Law--Scope ofMcCarranFerguson Exemptionfor the "Business of lnsuranc"-Meaningof Boycott, 33 DuQ. L REV. 957,968 (Summer
1994) (opining that the Supreme Court was reluctant to hold that the business of insurance was interstate
commerce because such a holding could result in the complete deregulation of the insurance industry); Howard,
supra note 157, at 22.
166 SEC v. Nat'l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1969).
167 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531,539 (1978) (nothing that the assumption
following the Paul v. Virginia decision was "that the issuance of an insurance policy was not a transaction in
interstate commerce and that the States enjoyed a virtually exclusive domain over the insurance industry.").
168
15 U.S.C. § 12.
169
Id. § 1.
170 Id. § 41.

PROHIBITING DE FACTO INSURANCE REDLINING

expanded federal antitrust laws and regulations over interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters' Association
overruled Paulv. Virginia and held that all commercial enterprises that conduct
their activities across state lines are subjected to the regulatory power of
Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 17 1 The Court refused to make an
exception for the business of insurance. 172 The Court held that an insurance
company conducting a substantial portion of its business across state lines was
engaged in interstate commerce and, 73therefore, subject to congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause. 1
In response to the decision, in 1945, Congress enacted the McCarranFerguson Act. 174 The purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was "to restore the
supremacy of the states in the realm of insurance regulation." 175 The McCarranFerguson Act also granted certain exemptions from antitrust laws to insurance
companies. 176 The McCarran-Ferguson Act allowed for the continued regulation
177
by the States of the business of insurance for the good of the public interest.
Congress also explained that silence on its part "shall not be construed to impose
78
any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several states." 1
At its core, the McCarran-Ferguson Act confirmed that no "act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by any state for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.' ' 179 Consequently, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act removed all Commerce Clause limitations on the
authority of the states to regulate the business of insurance 18 so long as
contradictory federal legislation did not specifically relate to the business of
insurance. 181 "The McCarran-Ferguson Act established a form of 'inverse
preemption,' letting state law prevail over general
federal rules that do not
82
specifically relate to the business of insurance." 1
Before the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars the application of federal law,
three conditions must be present: (1) the federal statute at issue must be a
171 See 232 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (stating the same).
172

See id. (not providing an exception).

173 See id. (holding the same); see also Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ins. Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1181 (6th

Cir. 1971) (applying the rule established in Southeastern Underwriters).
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1945).
175 Barnett Bank of Marion County NA v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1011).
174
176

See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 218 (1979) (noting the same).

177 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994).
178

Id.

179

15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply when the conflicting

federal statute "specifically relates to the business of insurance." Id.
180 See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653 (1981)
("Congress removed all Commerce Clause limitations on the authority of the States to regulate and tax the
business of insurance when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act.").
181 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430-31 (1946) (noting the exception).
182 NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1992).
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"general" statute that does not specifically relate to the "business of insurance";
(2) the state statute at issue was enacted for the purpose of regulating the
"business of insurance"; 183 and (3) application of
the federal statute would
184
"invalidate, impair or supercede" the state statute.
B. McCarran-FergusonAct Challengesto the FHA
1. Preemption of the FHA
In 1988, the FHA was amended, authorizing HUD to issue rules to
implement the Act. 185 HUD issued regulation 24 C.F.R. § 100.70, reflecting its
interpretation of the FHA's application to insurance companies. 24 C.F.R. §
100.70 defined "other prohibited sale and rental conduct" to include property and
hazard insurance.186 Courts have upheld as87 reasonable HUD's interpretation that
the FHA proscribes insurance redlining.1
Parties have challenged whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act inversely
preempts FHA's application to insurance redlining. In Mackey v. Nationwide
Insurance Company, 188 for example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that insurance redlining was not prohibited under the FHA.189 The lower court
had found that the McCarran-Ferguson Act190 shielded the alleged redlining
practices from challenges under the Sherman Act,191 the FHA, and the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866192 and 1871.'9' The district court specifically ruled that the
FHA does not prohibit "insurance redlining." The Fourth Circuit found that the
183

United Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982). The Supreme Court identified the

following factors to determine whether a practice constitutes the business of insurance: (1) whether the practice
has the effect of transferring or spreading the policyholders' risks; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of
the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) whether the practice is limited to entities
within the insurance industry. Id.
184
See United States Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500-01 (1993) (noting the exception).
185
Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 3614a (2000).
186
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4). The regulation provides in pertinent part: "Refusing to provide municipal
services or property or hazard insurance for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently
because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin." Id.
187
See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding HUD's
interpretation of the FHA); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (same);
Lindsey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 636, 642 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (same); Strange v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp. 1209, 1214 (E.D. Pa 1994) ("Given the deference that is due an agency's congressionally
delegated and plausible construction of a statute, the existence of this regulation supports plaintiffs' position that
Section [3604] applies to the business of insurance.").
18
Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
189 See id. at 423 (holding that § 804 does not permit the insurance redlining practice).
15 U.S.C. § 1011.
191 Id. § 1.
192 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985(3).
193
See Mackey, 724 F.2d at 420 (stating the District Court's holding). The court also addressed the
190

issue of whether the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, N.C.G.S. § 75-1, applied to insurance
redlining.
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McCarran-Ferguson Act barred the application of the Sherman Act, but
concluded that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not foreclose the claims brought
under the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871.194
In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit noted that the carrier had not pointed to
any law enacted by the State that would be "impaired" by applying the FHA or
federal civil rights legislation as would have triggered the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.195 The court held that the presence of a general federal regulatory scheme
did not establish that any particular state law would be invalidated, impaired or
however, concluded that the FHA does not
superseded. 196 The Fourth Circuit,
197

proscribe insurance redlining.
Other courts have held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not enacted
to address the problems of insurance redlining, which is within the special
province of the FHA.198 Courts have also held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not apply to federal civil rights legislation. 19 These courts have reasoned
that, based on the historical context, the legislative history, and judicial
interpretations of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress enacted the legislation
primarily to resolve the conflict between state regulation of insurers and the
federal antitrust laws. 200 When the McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in the
194 See id. at 421 ("The plaintiffs Sherman Act claim falls squarely within the exemption provided
by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act," but "the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars the plaintiff's claims under the Fair
Housing Act and the Civil Rights Acts.").
195
See id. (noting the plaintiffs failure to point to any North Carolina law).
196
See id. ("The presence of a general regulatory scheme does not show that any particular state law
would be invalidated, impaired or superseded by the application of the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights
Acts."). The Supreme Court has held that the term "invalidate" ordinarily means "to render ineffective,
generally without providing a replacement rule or law." Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 307 (1999). In
addition, the term "supersede" ordinarily means "to displace (and thus render ineffective) while providing a
substitute rule." Id. The term "impair" means "[t]o weaken, to make worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or
relax, or otherwise affect in an injurious manner." Id. at 309-10 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 752 (6th ed.
1990)).
197 See Mackey, 724 F.2d at 424 (finding "that § 804 does not proscribe the alleged hazard insurance
redlining practice"). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, since the enactment of the FHA in 1968,
several attempts were made in 1978, 1979 and 1980 to amend the FHA to specifically refer to insurance, but
those attempts failed. See id. The Fourth Circuit also noted that the congressional debates seeking to amend the
FHA included statements that the FHA should not include insurance and, therefore, there was no consensus that
the 1968 Congress intended to proscribe discrimination in providing insurance when enacting the FHA. See id
(citing Congressman Butler and Representative McClory). The Fourth Circuit held that, since there is no
reference to insurance in the 1968 statute or in its legislative history, the failure of the proposed amendments to
include insurance as part of the FHA supported its conclusion that the FHA does not proscribe "insurance
redlining." Id.
198
See, e.g., Dunn v. Midwestem Indemn. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F.Supp. 1106, 1111 (S.D.
Ohio 1979) ("[T]he McCarran Act ... [was] not intended to, address the problems of insurance redlining;
rather, this issue is the especial province of the Fair Housing Act.").
199 See, e.g., NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287,294-95 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply to federal civil rights legislation); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1064-66 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on othergrounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983), reinstatedas
modified, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
200
See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 218 n.18 (1979) ("The
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1940s, federal civil rights legislation had yet to be enacted until 1957.201 By
doing so, Congress did not intend that subsequently enacted federal civil rights
legislation would be inapplicable to all activities
of an insurance company that is
20 2
classified as "the business of insurance."
In NAACP v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company,20 3 for
example, noting that the McCarran-Ferguson Act states that "[n]o Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted
by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ...unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance," the Seventh Circuit
held that the phrase "[n]o Act of Congress" is exceedingly broad and does not
differentiate federal civil rights legislation or restrict the application of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act solely to legislation previously enacted. 2° The Seventh
Circuit held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act applied to all federal laws, past and
future.20 5 The Court noted that the general principle is that federal laws that do
not conflict with or supersede state rules are always enforceable. 20 6 Federal laws
that are inconsistent with state laws are only enforceable if Congress specifically
states so directly. 20 7 The FHA, however, does not even obliquely contain
statutory language that it is enforceable despite possible inconsistencies with
McCarran-Ferguson Act operates to assure that the States are free to regulate insurance companies without fear
of Commerce Clause attack."); SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453,458-59 (1969) ("Congress was
mainly concerned with the relationship between insurance ratemaking and the antitrust laws, and with the power
of the States to tax insurance companies.").
201
See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d at 294 ("Congress had no intention in the 1940s of
curtailing the scope of laws yet to be enacted-indeed, inconceivable at the time. (After southern states regained
representation in the Senate following the Civil War, no civil rights laws were enacted until 1957...
202 Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1065.
203
NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992).
204 See id. at 294-95 (holding a narrower view for the phrase "No Act of Congress").
205
See id. ("The McCarran-Ferguson Act creates a rule of construction applicable to all other federal
laws, a 'plain statement' approach.... Congress did not tie its hands; instead it prescribed the consequences of
silence and specificity in other acts past and future."). In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's discussion regarding
the failed attempts to amend the FHA as a rationale for the FHA not proscribing insurance redlining, the
Seventh Circuit noted that proposed legislation can fail for many reasons. The Seventh Circuit stated:
Some Members of Congress may oppose the proposal on the merits; others may think it
unnecessary and therefore not worth the political capital needed to write the "clarification" into the
statute over opposition; still others may be indifferent, or seek to use the bill as a vehicle for some
unrelated change. Congress may run out of time, as a noncontroversial bill sits in a queue while a
contentious proposal is debated. No surprise, therefore, that the Supreme Court repeatedly reminds
us that unsuccessful proposals to amend a law, in the years following its passage, carry no
significance. Were it otherwise, one House of Congress could change the meaning of a law by
refusing to approve a change in the text. Yet Congress may change the law only by bicameral
action, which implies that the refusal of one chamber to assent to a proposed amendment cannot
alter the meaning of the law on which both chambers agreed in prior years.
Id. at 299-300 (citations omitted).
206 See id. at 295 ("Federal laws that do not conflict with or supersede state rules always apply.").
2w
See id.(stating the same).
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state law. Nevertheless, in rejecting the carrier's contention that the McCarranFerguson Act inverse-preempted the FHA, the Seventh Circuit held that the FHA
is an "'Act of Congress' that does not 'specifically relate.., to the business of
insurance"' and "therefore does not 'invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
208
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.'
The Seventh Circuit is not alone in its conclusion that the McCarranFerguson Act does not inversely preempt the FHA. 2° 9 Other courts have held
similarly in other civil rights contexts.21 ° Indeed, although not in the context of
the FHA, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that Congress did not
intend to cede the field of insurance regulation to the states.2 1' The McCarranFerguson Act seeks to protect state regulation primarily against inadvertent
federal intrusion, but does not insulate state insurance regulation from federal
regulation. 212 The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that all federal law
is inversely preempted unless the statutory scheme expressly states otherwise. 213
Adopting a similar argument put forth by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the
Supreme Court has held that if Congress meant to preempt generally the field of
insurance law for the states, the McCarran-Ferguson Act could have stated: "No
federal statute [that does not say so explicitly] shall be construed to apply to the
business of insurance., 214 The high court noted that Congress alternatively
208

Id.

209

See, e.g., Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290,297 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the MFA does

not inverse-preempt the FHA); Moore v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1222 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(stating that McCarran-Ferguson did not inverse-preempt §§ 1981 and 1982); Merchants Home Delivery Serv.
v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the application of a federal statute
prohibiting acts which are also prohibited under a state's insurance laws does not "invalidate, impair, or
supersede" the state's laws under § 26 of the MFA); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351,
1360-61 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Thus, because the Fair Housing Act does not mention insurance, it is covered by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and cannot be construed in such a way as to invalidate, impair, or supersede any state
law enacted to regulate the business of insurance.").
210
See, e.g., Women of City Gov't United v. City of New York, 515 F.Supp. 295,306 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that McCarran-Ferguson did not preclude the application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to the use
of a sex differentiated actuarial table); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256 (N.D. Ohio 1981),
reversed in part on other grounds, 727 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that McCarran-Ferguson was
inapplicable in a Title VII action alleging a discriminatory denial of pregnancy-related disability benefits); Ben
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F.Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 1974) (stating that McCarran-Ferguson does
not bar claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1985); Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702 (5th Cir.
2002) (stating that McCarran-Ferguson does not inverse-preempt the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, and
did not preclude arbitration clause contained in that consumer loans that included the purchase of credit life and
credit disability insurance). But see Does v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
an interpretation of the ADA that would proscribe capping medical insurance policy benefits for AIDS was
preempted by McCarran-Ferguson Act).
211
See Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 308 (1999) (addressing inverse-preemption of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961).
222
See Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996) (setting out the
purpose of the MFA).
213
See id. at 40 (noting that Federal Statutes need not explicitly state that State laws are pre-empted).
214
Id. at 39 (adopting the argument put forth by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits); Merchants Home
Delivery Serv. Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., 50 F.3d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995).
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could have provided that federal legislation generally, or a particular statutory
scheme, would be "applicable to the business of insurance [only] to the extent
that such business is not regulated by State Law. ''215 The Supreme Court has
also rejected a view that the McCarran-Ferguson Act allowed for federal
regulation of insurance whenever the federal law does not directly conflict with
state regulation. 216 In construing the most sensible interpretation, the Supreme
Court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does inverse-preempt federal law
that is not directly in conflict with state regulation, and when application of the
federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere with a
217
state's administrative regime.
2. Failureto Enforce the State FairHousing Laws
The McCarran-Ferguson Act purports to prohibit federal causes of
actions when a State has enacted laws regulating insurance. 2 18 Generally, courts
will not inquire into whether the state is actually enforcing its insurance laws.21 9
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has refused to examine
whether state statutes were being adequately enforced. 220 The court held that for
the McCarran-Ferguson exemption to apply, all that needed to be shown was that
22
the state had "generally authorized or permitted certain standards of conduct. 1
The court observed:
We find no support for the appellant's argument that the court in this
case should inquire into the question as to whether the statutes of
Ohio have been effectively enforced in accordance with their
terms.... [T]here is nothing in the language of the McCarran Act or
in its legislative history to support the thesis that the act does not
apply wh 9 2the state's scheme of regulation has not been effectively
enforced.

215
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A., 517 U.S. at 39 (noting that Congress did so in the Sherman,
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).
216
217

Id.
Id.

15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
See Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ins. Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir. 1971) (reviewing a lawsuit
alleging that State insurance regulation was a "sham" and a "mere pretense").
220
See id. (refusing to examine enforcement of state statute).
221
Id. at 1182 (citing Cal. League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857,
218
219

860 (N.D. Cal. 1959)).
222

Id at 1184; see also Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 548 F.2d 729, 734 (8th Cit. 1977) (stating

that McCarran-Ferguson Act applies despite the fact that the state does not provide for a private right of action);
Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Mktg. Assocs., 389 F. Supp. 1141, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1974) (finding
the McCarran-Ferguson Act not applicable because the claim was not part of the business of insurance).
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Unfortunately, this indifference acts as a shield for insurance companies from
anti-discrimination laws.223 Furthermore,
[sitate power to regulate necessarily includes the discretion to
prohibit, permit, or limit insurance practices as the State sees fit. The
McCarran-Ferguson Act clearly contemplates that where a State
undertakes to regulate the business of insurance, it has the power to
permit practices which would otherwise violate federal antitrust laws;
if the exemption is only to apply when state law squarely prohibits all
acts which would, absent the exemption, violate the antitrust laws, the
state regulation which the McCarran-Ferguson Act aims to foster, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012(a), would be a nullity.224
3. FederalResponsibilities When A State Condones Insurance Redlining
An interesting issue was tangentially discussed by the Seventh Circuit in
NAACP v. American FamilyMutual Insurance Co. 225 As previously discussed,
the Seventh Circuit held in NAACP that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not
inversely preempt a FHA lawsuit challenging insurance "red-lining" based upon
race. 226 The Seventh Circuit noted that if the State of Wisconsin wanted to
authorize redlining it only needed to enact a statute explicitly allowing such
practice. 227 The Seventh Circuit noted that the insurance carrier had not argued
that there were any laws, regulations, or case law in Wisconsin that required
redlining, condoned the practice, committed to insurers all decisions about
redlining, or held that redlining did not violate state law whether it was a result
of discriminatory intent or disparate impact. 228 The Court also noted that no
Wisconsin official appeared in the litigation contending that a remedy under the
FHA would frustrate any state policy. 229 The Court held that the McCarranFerguson Act gave states the final word on the regulation of insurance unless
Congress specifically overrode those choices.230 Wisconsin law, the Seventh
Circuit held, was consistent with the FHA.2 31
In light of the federal government's role to ensure that states do not deny
their citizens' fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the Seventh
223 See, e.g., Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated by, 103 S.Ct.
3566 (1983) (holding that an insurer is not bound by Title VI because it furnishes services to a Title VII
employer).
224 Dexter v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 527 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1975).
225 NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992).
226 See id. at 295 (finding that the FHA could apply to allegations of racially discriminatory redlining).
227 Id. at 297.
228 Id.
229
230
231

Id.
id.
Id.
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Circuit's analysis is fundamentally flawed. Both the federal government and the
states must ensure equal protection under the laws.232 The Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments were intended as limitations on a state's power and
enlargements of Congress' power. 2 3 The Seventh Circuit's rationale suggests
that Congress can disavow its constitutional duties under the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments and forgo enforcing those Amendments by enacting
legislation; namely, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, that would not preclude states
from allowing badges and incidents of slavery to exist, from abridging the
privileges or immunities of its citizens, or from denying equal protection of the
laws. The enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
do not grant Congress the power to dilute equal protection rights and do not
grant Congress the power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute the constitutional
guarantees contained therein: 234 "Congress may not authorize the States to
violate the Equal Protection Clause. ''235 Nor can Congress abdicate its duties
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 36 Congress must enact
legislation that respects the rights guaranteed under these Amendments. 231 More
importantly, any state legislation that would violate these constitutional
guarantees, such as the hypothetical Wisconsin statute condoning insurance
238
redlining, is void ab initio. Therefore, states may choose to enact legislation
232

See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that the Fifth Amendment precludes the federal government

from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194, 195 (1968) (stating that the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal
government); Mathews v. de Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 182 (1976) ("It is well settled that the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause encompasses equal protection principles."); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,638
n.2 (1975) ("While the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that
is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.") (quotations and modifications omitted); United States v.
Pollard, 326 F.3d 397, 406 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954)) (finding
that the equal protection guarantees under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment is similar to the
guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment).
233
See Ex pane Commonwealth of Va., 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (stating that the constitutional
federalism of the United States was adopted to protect "fundamental liberties" and not as a mechanism to forgo
those liberties).
234
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,491 (1966) ("Where rights secured by the Constitution are
involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.").
235
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,641 (1969), overruledinpart by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) ("Congress is without power to enlist state cooperation in ajoint federal-state program by legislation
which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause."); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266,272 (1973) ("It is clear, of course, that no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the
Constitution.").
236
Cf Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,725 (1961) ("But no State may effectively
abdicate its responsibilities [under the Fourteenth Amendment] by either ignoring them or by merely failing to
discharge them whatever the motive may be."); Georgia Power Co. v. City of Decatur, 281 U.S. 505, 508
(1930) ("The state may not by any of its agencies disregard the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
237
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) ("[N]either Congress nor a State can validate a law that
denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Hill v. State of Texas, 316 U.S. 400,406 (1942)
("Equal protection of the laws is something more than an abstract right. It is a command which the state must
respect, the benefits of which every person may demand.").
238
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and
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that proscribes insurance redlining; however, the enactment of such regulation
would not preclude the federal government from enforcing the FHA or any other
type of similar legislation that would proscribe insurance redlining.
IV. Preventing De Facto Redlining by Imposition of a
Moratoriumon Policy Renewals
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana Department of
Insurance issued emergency rules requiring insurance companies to give policy
holders affected by Hurricanes Katrina or Rita an automatic extension of time to
pay their insurance premiums without incurring any late fees, penalties,
cancellation, or non-renewal. 239 The emergency rules also preclude insurance
companies from canceling or non-renewing policies solely because the insured
submitted a claim because of Hurricane Katrina. 240 Mississippi 24 1 and
Alabama 242 also enacted moratoriums on cancellations and non-renewals. The
state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or
which injures them in life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the
equal protection of the laws."); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 346 (1935) (determining that
courts cannot uphold statutes that violate the constitution); Wolff v. City of New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358, 365
(1880) ("Legislation producing this latter result ...
is prohibited by the Constitution, and must be disregardedtreated as if never enacted-by all courts recognizing the Constitution as the paramount law of the land.").
239 See Emergency Rules 15, 16 & 17, LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 37, § 2700 (2005) (mandating compliance
with state-imposed procedures to ensure coverage in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita). On September
19, 2005, Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco signed an executive order giving the Commissioner of
Insurance the temporary authority to implement certain emergency insurance rules in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina and it aftermath. Exec. Order KBB 2005-40, § 4. The Commissioner issued Emergency Rules 15, 16,
and 17, that included, among other things, that an insurance carrier cannot cancel or now-renew policies for
certain affected parishes because of a Hurricane Katrina claim. LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 37, § 2700 (2005).
Louisiana also adopted Emergency Rule 23, which suspended the rights of any admitted insurer or surplus line
insurer to cancel or non-renew any personal residential, commercial residential, or commercial property
insurance policy that sustained damage as a result of Hurricanes Katrina or Rita until sixty days after substantial
completion of the repair and/or reconstruction of the policy or December 11, 2006. Id.
240 See id.
(stating the same).
241 Beginning on September 15, 2005, the Mississippi Insurance Department ("MID"), for example,
imposed a moratorium on cancellations because of the failure to pay premiums during the sixty days following
August 29, 2005. MID Bulletin 2005-7 (2005). The moratorium was extended for an additional sixty days on
October 26,2005. MID Bulletin 2005-12 (2005). The MID issued a directive on November 4, 2005 limiting
cancellations to property damaged by Hurricane Katrina for which repairs have not yet been completed. The
directive precluded insurers from canceling or refusing to renew a "personal or commercial residential property
policy" covering a dwelling or residential property in Mississippi that has been damaged by Katrina for a period
of sixty days after the property has been repaired. MID Bulletin 2005-13 (2005). Bulletin 2005-13 was
amended on January 27, 2006 to include cancellations/non-renewals of commercial property. MID Bulletin
2005-13 (2006).
242 Even before Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 28, 2005, Alabama had in place a policy
prohibiting cancellations and non-renewals of automobile or property insurance policies based solely on claims
arising from a catastrophe, natural disaster, act of nature, or weather related cause. Bulletin dated July 20, 2004
from Walter A, Bell, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Insurance. More recently, the Alabama
Department of Insurance issued a bulletin on January 3, 2007 requiring written notice tothe Commissioner and
to the insured of non-renewal of coverage based upon the insurer's desire to reduce its exposure to potential
catastrophic events, including but not limited to a hurricane. An insurer's failure to comply with either bulletin
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insurance non-cancellation and non-renewal moratorium utilized in Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama is less comprehensive than the moratorium approach
used by the Florida Department of Insurance in the aftermath of Hurricane
Andrew.243
This patchwork approach of state legislation may be ineffective when
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina are regional in nature and not contained to
one state. Moreover, their impact may not only affect the residents of the state
but also residents in states not affected by the particular natural disaster. Hence a
comprehensive, national legislative approach is more advisable and would allow
a uniform solution to the problem.
In 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused unprecedented physical, economic
and social damage. 244 Andrew's 150-180 mph winds destroyed more than
60,000 homes, leaving as many as a quarter million people homeless. 245 The
storm caused between $16 to $18 billion in property damage, making it one of
the costliest natural disasters in United States history. 246 Insurance companies
247
had underappreciated the potential destruction of a hurricane such as Andrew.
Shoddy construction practices and significant violations of South Florida
building codes were unearthed as homes, which should have remained substantially intact, collapsed like matchboxes. 248 The monetary losses from
Andrew were twice the value of collected premiums in Florida for the preceding
twenty years. 249 The hurricane immediately bankrupted ten of Florida's
insurance companies which reported that the claims of policyholders exceeded
the capital surplus and reinsurance set aside for the mounting claims. 250 Those
is considered an unfair trade practice.
See infra notes 251-258 and accompanying text.
243
244 See Larry Rohter, HurricaneAndrew: Supplies Flow In for Stricken Areas, but Delivery is Slowed
by Wreckage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at B9 (discussing the extent of damages that Hurricane Andrew
inflicted).
245 See id. (stating the same).
246 See Thomas S. Mulligan, QuakePayout to the Insurers ThirdHighest, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, at
IA (noting the cost of damage, in dollars, for different natural disasters. Unlike Katrina's destructive wrath in
New Orleans, Andrew managed to spare the greater Miami area from major damage which insurance
companies estimated could have tripled Andrew's price tag. See Carl Hiaasen, Government Can'tBe Trusted
to Enforce Codes, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 30, 1993, at BI.
247 See Insurance Companies Retrench in Wake ofDisasters,L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1993, at D9 (noting
past insurance company mistakes).
248 See Hiaasen, supra note 246, at B 1 (discussing the realities of a system where the government
prescribed building codes are virtually unenforceable).
249 See Christina Sherry, FloridaHomeowner's Feel Pinch as Insurance CompaniesBail Out, WASH.
POST, June 13, 1993, at A3 (noting that an estimated $10.8 billion in premiums were collected from Florida
homeowners, but $18 billion were incurred as losses).
250 See Albert D. Crenshaw, Insurance Firms Curbing CoverageforHomeowners-CoastalAreas Most
Affected by Retrenchment, WASH. POST, May 8, 1993, at El (detailing the financial ramifications for insurance
companies caused by Hurricane Andrew). Several insurance companies escaped permanent insolvency because
of large capital infusions from their parent corporations. As an example, Prudential Property & Casualty
Corporation had a capital base of $575 million when Andrew struck and eventually paid out claims of more than
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insurance companies that survived reanalyzed their potential risks of hurricane
originating catastrophic losses and developed new underwriting models that
reassessed and recalculated an acceptable level of exposure. 25 1
Because insurance companies had over-exposed themselves to excessive
risk in the coastal regions of hurricane prone South Florida, they began to retreat
from offering insurance in that area.252 The insurance companies began
developing catastrophic loss prevention plans calling for significant cancellations
and non-renewals of existing homeowner policies and, in some instances,
withdrawal from the Florida's
residential property and casualty insurance
253
marketplace altogether.

The Florida Department of Insurance (FDOI) reacted quickly to the
impending and anticipated wave of policy cancellations and non-renewals.
Initially the FDOI issued emergency rules limiting the number of permissible
cancellations or non-renewals of homeowner insurance policies in the hardest hit
counties, Dade and Broward.25 4 The FDOI then issued the emergency Rule
4ER93-18, which imposed a six month moratorium on the non-renewal or
cancellation of homeowner's insurance policies, due to the risk of hurricane
loss. 255 This emergency moratorium was an attempt to temporarily stabilize the

residential homeowner's insurance
The Florida Legislature
256 marketplace.
codified the emergency regulation. This moratorium law contains a provision
$1.3 billion. See David Satterfield, PrudentialSues to Drop 25,000-InsurerChallengesState's Moratorium,
MIAMI HERALD, June 30, 1993, at Al. The losses from Andrew effectively bankrupted Prudential Property &
Casualty Corp. Id. Were it not for a capital infusion of $900 million from its parent corporation, Prudential
Insurance Company of America, Prudential Property & Casualty would have failed and its policyholders would
have been left empty-handed to the tune of more than $600 million. Id.
251 See Insurance CompaniesRetrench in Wake of Disasters,supra note 247 (discussing post-disaster
insurance company business strategies).
252 See Phillip Longmore, The Politics of Wind: How Tallahassee's $36 Billion DollarInsurance
Scheme Could Blow You Away, FLORIDA TREND, Sept. 1994, at 36 (discussing driving causes of insurance
companies actions).
253 Insurance companies will often develop plans to reduce their exposure in catastrophic loss prone
areas which will be deemed necessary to protect the remaining policyholders throughout the state and across the
nation from a company's insolvency in the event of another catastrophic hurricane. These types of plans can
call for significant cancellations and non-renewals of existing homeowner policies or, in the case of some of the
hardest hit insurers, withdrawal from the state's residential property and casualty insurance marketplace.
254 See 4ER92-2, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 5371 (Sept. 11, 1992); 4ER92-3, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly
5490 (Sept. 18, 1992); 4ER92-8, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 6223 (Oct. 16, 1992); 4ER92-14, 18 Fla. Admin.
Weekly 6929 (Nov. 13, 1992); 4ER92-24, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 7517 (Dec. 4. 1992).
255 See 4ER93-18, 19 Fla. Admin. Weekly 3079 (June 4, 1993). This emergency rule, however, was
legally valid for only ninety days. See 120.54(9)(c), FLA. STAT. However, the Florida Legislature enacted
Ch.apter 93-401, Laws of Florida, which essentially imposed a six-month moratorium upon the cancellation or
non-renewal of homeowner's insurance policies based on the risk of hurricane claims. The preamble to
Ch.apter 93-401, Laws of Florida, provides as its justification that "the enormous monetary impact to insurers
of Hurricane Andrew claims has prompted insurers to propose substantial cancellation or non-renewal of their
homeowner's [policies]." In November 1993, when the initial moratorium was scheduled to expire, the Florida
Legislature met in a special session and approved a three-year extension, and subsequent phase out of the
moratorium. See Ch. 93-410, 1993 Fla. Laws 7; Ch. 93-411, 1993 Fla. Laws 46.
256 See Ch. 93-401, Section 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2881. The Florida legislature enacted Chapter 93-401,
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providing for potential insolvency. In order to avoid an unreasonable risk of
insolvency, however, insurance companies had to affirmatively demonstrate that
any proposed cancellation or non-renewal was necessary to avoid an unreasonable risk of insolvency.25 7 The law also had a business phase-out provision.
Insurers sought relief from the denial of an administrative application for an
exemption by appealing the decision in court.259
Florida also had a withdrawal statute which authorized insurance
companies to surrender their Certificates of Authority and withdraw from the
state or from a specific line of insurance upon proper notice. 26 0 The FDOI
construed the phase-out statute, however, as superceding an insurer's right to
surrender its Certificate of Authority and withdraw its business from the state's
residential property insurance market pursuant to Section 624.430.261
The Florida Legislature then created Section 215.555, which provided
for the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Trust Fund.262 The Florida Hurricane
Laws of Florida, which essentially imposed a six-month moratorium upon the cancellation or non-renewal of
homeowner's insurance policies based on the risk of hurricane claims.
257
See id. In reaching a determination that the insurance company is facing an unreasonable risk of
insolvency, the FDOI must consider the insurer's size, its market concentration, its general financial condition,
the degree to which personal fines residential property insurance companies insurance comprises its insurance
business within the state of Florida, and the way in which those factors impact on the risk of the insurer's
insolvency in relationship to its probable maximum loss in the event of a hurricane. An insurance company,
however, is not required to risk more than its total surplus to an objectively defined maximum loss resulting
from one Florida hurricane loss event.
258
See FLA. STAT. 18C, § 627.7013 (repealed 2002) (providing that in any twelve month period, an
insurance company may not cancel or non-renew more than five percent of its homeowners' policies, mobile
home owners' policies or personal lines residential policies within the state, and may not cancel or non-renew
more than ten percent of its homeowners' policies, mobile home owners' policies or personal lines residential
policies within a given county, to reduce the insurer's exposure to hurricane claims). FLA. STAT. 18C, §
627.7013 also provided that any insurance company seeking to exceed these limits on cancellation or nonrenewals within a given year must file a phase-out plan with the FDOI and obtain the FDOI's approval before
implementing the plan. Id; see also 20 Fla. Admin. Weekly 531 (February 4, 1994) (stating that the exception
of the phase-out statute has been narrowed by the FDOI's liberal interpretation of the statute so that any reason
given by an insurance company for canceling or nonrenewing a particular homeowner's policy can be deemed
to be related to the risk of hurricane loss. As an example, in Proposed Rules 4-141.020(9)(a) and 4141.021(3)(a)(3), the FDOI asserts that the statutory word "unrelated" must be construed in a "liberal, widereaching manner." Consequently, to be exempted from the phase-out statute's moratorium limits, a nonrenewal of a residential policy "must be completely unrelated, directly or indirectly, to reduction of risk of loss
from hurricane exposure.").
259
See Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Dep't of Ins., 626 So.2d 994, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) ("We conclude that, by virtue of section 120.68(1), Florida Statutes, rule 9.030(b)(1)(C), Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure, and Article V, section 4(b)(2), of the Florida Constitution, we have jurisdiction to
review the department's decision in its August 10 letter denying the requested exemption.").
260
FLA. STAT. 18A, § 624.430 (2004).
261
See 20 Fla. Admin. Weekly 531, 534 (February 4, 1994) (discussing the interpretation of § 627.7013
and stating that the moratorium law, on its face, only applied to insurance companies that chose to remain in the
residential property insurance market and did not affect an insurer's right to cancel or non-renew such policies
in connection with its formal withdrawal from the market, regardless of whether that withdrawal and resulting
cancellations or non-renewals were related to the risk of hurricane loss).
262
The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Trust Fund was established by Chapter 93-430, which was
codified in section 215.555. See FLA. STAT. IOC, § 215.555 (2005).
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Catastrophe Trust Fund requires the Fund to "reimburse the insurer for 75% of
their losses from covered losses in excess of two times the insurer's gross direct
written premium from covered policies." 263 A mandatory assessment upon all
insurers is used to capitalize the Fund, which theoretically will act as a buffer for
hurricane catastrophes
which inflict damages in excess of the insurer's collective
264
pay.
to
ability
Similar to what occurred in the State of Florida after Hurricane Andrew,
insurance companies issuing policies in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and
other Gulf States affected by Hurricane Katrina may cancel existing policies or
non-renew policies to reduce their financial exposure in the affected region.265
Such a withdrawal from the region may constitute de facto insurance redlining
because of the demographics impacted.2 66 Alternatively, similar to what
occurred after the 1960s riots, because of the minority demographics in Gulf
States, insurers may exaggerate potential losses sustained from future natural or
man-made disasters occurring after Hurricane Katrina and incorporate
exaggerated risks into their underwriting policies, resulting in substantially
increased premiums.267 As a consequence of these higher premium rates,
residents of the Gulf States may remain or become uninsured or underinsured,
268
which could negatively affect the rebuilding efforts in the Gulf.
Requiring that insurers participate in the region, notwithstanding the
financial risks from future storms, may cause insurers to become insolvent-an
inadvertent result which would not only affect Gulf States residents, but also
residents of non-Gulf States who may, as a result of insolvency, have no
insurance coverage. 2 69 Alternatively, insurers may simply raise premiums
significantly to offset the losses due to exposure in the region. 270 As a result, the
minority population in the region may decide to remain uninsured or underSee id. § 215.555 (4)(b).
See id. § 215.555 (6)(b).
265 See generally Victoria McGrane, Insurers UnderSiege, CQ WEEKLY, May 4,2007 (discussing
the legal battle between a Gulf Coast resident and two major insurance companies).
263
264

266

See generally NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, THE CRISIS OF HOUSING SEGREGATION 30

(2007), http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/resources/newsArchive/2007%20Fair%2OHousing%2OTrends%20
Report.pdf (discussing the homeowners insurance discrimination in the area).
267

See generally Paul Greenberg, Insurance: The Hidden Story of Post-Katrina, Apr. 06, 2007,

http:llwww.hurricane-katrina.org/2007/04/insurance the h 1.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (discussing the
high homeowners insurance premiums post Hurricane Katrina) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
268 See id. (stating that the homeowners are not able to rebuild houses because of high insurance cost).
269 See generally Seth Dunn & Christopher Flavin, DestructiveStorms Drive InsuranceLosses Up, Will
Taxpayers Have to Bail Out InsuranceIndustry, Mar. 26, 1999, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/1648 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2008) (discussing destructive storms place insurance industry in danger of insolvency) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
270 See generally id. (discussing how insurance companies deal with losses because of destructive
storms).
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240

insured, which itself results in de facto insurance redlining. 271 Because losses are
potentially staggering and the market may only bear limited premium increases,
insurers may attempt to spread the risk of loss in the Gulf region to all of its
policyholders. 272 Consequently, policyholders in non-Gulf States could also
potentially experience increased premiums because of a single state regulation.27 3
274
A
Insurers and policyholders alike may not be without recourse.
moratorium or similar statute or regulation enacted by Gulf States may violate
several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 275 the Contract Clause, 276 and the Due Process
Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.27 7
A. The Taking Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 278 "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar [the]
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 279 Although the
prohibitions contained in the Fifth Amendment are addressed to the federal
government, the Fifth Amendment also applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 280 An insurance contract can constitute property subject
to an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.2 8'
271

See Greenberg, infranote 267 (stating that some residents in the region decided not to buy insurance

because of financial difficulties).
272 See Joseph B. Treaster, Gulf CoastInsurance Expected to Soar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005, at C1
(stating that premiums are expected to rise in areas of the United States far from the Gulf Coast as well).
273 See generallyPR Newswire, ConsumersOppose State InsuranceRegulation That EncourageMore
Risky Driving and Help Wealthy Homeowners, June 20, 2007, http://www.insuranceheadlines.com/AutoInsurance/3407.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (stating that state regulations make consumers pay higher
insurance premiums) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
274

RAWLE 0. KING, HURRICAN KATRINA:

INSURANCE LOSSES AND NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR

FINANCING DISASTER RISK 2 (2005), http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53683.pdf (discussing
federal policy alternatives to build national capacities for disaster risk management).
27

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

276 U.S.CONST. art. I, § 10.
277 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
278

U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

279 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
280
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121-23 (1978) (holding that the
Takings Clause also applies to the states).
281 See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,579 (1934) (indicating that valid contracts are property);
see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that the company's interest in
its health, safety, and environmental data is cognizable as a trade-secret property right and that property right is
protected by the Takings Clause); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1960) (stating that lien
provided under the state law should be protected by the Takings Clause); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
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Although the Takings Clause applies to physical invasions of
property, 282 certain invasions of private property are deemed a "per se taking"
without regard to the state's interest in possessing or otherwise using the
property. 283 Thus, a "per se taking" would occur, for example, if a statute
effectuates an actual government takeover of a private insurance company. 284
The Takings Clause also requires compensation where a statutory
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of property. 285
When the legislation disregards or destroys existing contractual rights (for
example, the right to cancel an insurance contract), that does not automatically
transform the regulation into a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment .2
286

The factors used to determine whether a regulatory taking exists are:287 (1) the
economic impact of the challenged rule, regulation, or statute on the insurer; (2)
the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the nature of the challenged action.288 Insurers can
challenge statutes or regulations enacted by0 Gulf States as "facially" unconstitu29

tional 289 or unconstitutional "as applied..

Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-602 (1935) (holding the property of individual mortgagees should be protected by
the Takings Clause).
282 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (holding that the Taking Clause
requires compensation for "regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his
property"); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 & 436 (1982) (stating that
when the character of "the governmental action" is a permanent physical occupation of property, a taking to the
extent of the occupation is uniformly found, and such an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a
regulation of the use of property).
283 "In addition to physical invasions of property, the Supreme Court has also accorded 'categorical [per
se] treatment,' invariably requiring compensation, to cases 'where regulation denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of land."' New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1089 (1996).
284

See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (holding that the Takings Clause is

applied when the government took total, direct control of a private business); United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (stating that when the government totally controls a private business, the Takings
Clause is applied).

285
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (indicating that categorical treatment is appropriate when the regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)
(stating that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking").
286
See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 2 11, 224 (1986) (indicating that the fact that
legislation disregards or destroys existing contractual rights does not always transform the regulation into an
illegal taking).
27
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978) (stating that in
detennining whether the government conduct constitutes a taking requires that the court engage in an ad hoc,
factual inquiry and discuss the variety of interests involved and to be considered in a takings case). "These 'ad
hoc, factual inquiries' must be conducted with respect to specific property, and the particular estimates of
economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the unique circumstances." Hodel v. Va.Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981).
288
See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224-26 (indicating the three factors which are particularly significant
when determining whether there is a taking).
289
See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,259-61 (1980) (discussing if the zoning ordinances on
their face violated the Takings Clause).
290 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127 (discussing whether any restriction imposed on
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Insurers can assert that they will sustain substantial financial losses as a
result of any prohibition of withdrawal from the Gulf States. Moreover, insurers
can assert that any statutory or regulatory scheme precludes them from allocating
company's resources as they see fit and forces them to suffer net economic losses
both in and outside of the Gulf, resulting in a taking of their "property" without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The compulsory nature
of any statutory or regulatory scheme that would hypothetically mandate all
insurance companies currently doing business in the Gulf states to remain in
those states' insurance markets, however, would likely not result in a regulatory
taking, unless the insurer can show that it was denied all beneficial use of
"property"; namely, the insurance contract. Any "compelled" insurance contract
will likely still belong to the insurer. Insureds will likely still pay the insurer all
required premiums. The insurer would likely still be able to cancel or non-renew
any policies for non-hurricane related reasons and the insurer will likely still be
able to apply for rate increases. Consequently, the insurer may initially have a
difficult time establishing that it was denied all beneficial use of the insurance
contract.
To establish that the insurer has been denied all beneficial use of the
insurance contract, the insurer would need to provide evidence of the specific
economic loss in the Gulf market as result of any moratorium. The insurer may
need to provide evidence of its rate of return in the Gulf market since any
moratorium was put into existence and whether that return is reasonable. The
insurer could show that its applications for rate increases have been denied and
that any potential for future rate increases would not alleviate the insurer's
ongoing economic loss, especially if previous rate increases have been applied
for and denied. The insurer could also argue that any hypothetical moratorium
may end on a specific date, but that there is no assurance that the moratorium
will not be extended beyond the scheduled expiration date and, therefore, the full
extent of the economic impact on the insurer remains to be determined until the
moratorium has indeed expired.
Interference with investment-backed expectations occurs when the
earlier regulation does not provide companies with sufficient notice that they
may be subject to the new or additional regulation.291 When a statutory or
regulatory scheme has been previously amended, however, then a business is on
notice that the legislation may be amended in the future such that there will be
additional financial obligations.292 An insurer could argue that the hypothetical

individual landmarks pursuant to the regulation is a taking).
291 See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 226-28 (stating the same).
292
See id.at 227 (quoting FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84,91 (1958) ("Those who do business in
the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve
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moratorium statute interferes with its reasonable investment-backed expectations
because whatever regulation the insurer may have anticipated based upon
previous amendments in effect while they conducted business in the Gulf
market, the insurer could not have anticipated that withdrawal from that market
would be prohibited.
The proposed moratorium is not simply an additional regulation as a
condition of doing business. The moratorium itself requires that the insurer
continue doing business in the market. As such, different principles apply. In
Yee v. City of Escondido,293 for example, mobile home park owners filed a
lawsuit against the municipality, alleging that a local rent control ordinance
amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amendment and entitled them to compensation. The U.S. Supreme Court held that there was no taking because the
ordinance did not compel landlords to rent their mobile homes; instead, landlords
were free to evict their tenants. 294 The U.S. Supreme Court noted, however, that
"[a] different case would be presented were the statute, on its face or as applied,
to compel a landowner over objection to rent his property or to refrain in
perpetuity from terminating a tenancy., 295 Courts have also recognized that
"[w]hile [a state's] police power may limit and restrict the uses to which an
owner may put his property, it may not compel him to use such property for a
particular purpose if he prefers to abandon such a use thereof." 296 Because a
moratorium compels insurers to continue business in the market
against their
297
expectations.
investment-backed
their
with
wishes, it interferes
the legislative end.").
293 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
294 See id. at 527-28 (holding the same).
295 Id. at 528; see also People ex rel. Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 98 Misc.2d 856, 861, 414
N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) ("[Tlhis law expressly requires that.., insurance companies, like the
defendants, renew automobile insurance policies and, accordingly, itwarrants careful review.").
296 Dep't of Pub. Works v. City of San Diego, 10 P.2d 102, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932).
297 See People ex rel.Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co., 98 Misc.2d 856, 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (finding that
insurers could not be denied permission to give up writing all of their lines of insurance after sustaining
continuing losses writing automobile insurance); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of La., 251 U.S. 396,
399 (1920) ("A carrier cannot be compelled to carry on even a branch of business at aloss, much less the whole
business of carriage."). A state may constitutionally require, however, that a provider of a vital public service
provide that service to a part of its market even though it is not profitable for the business. See, e.g., Sheeran v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 625, 629 (N.J. 1979) (sustaining the constitutionality of legislation that
compelled automobile insurers to renew policies because the statute reflected "a clear legislative intent that
companies which choose to write automobile policies in the state maintain their fair share of coverage");
Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Dole, 784 F.2d 1245, 1251 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that an airline may be
compelled to operate one small route at a loss for a limited period of time); Md. Cas. Co. v. Comm'r of Ins.,
363 N.E.2d 1087 (1977) (establishing that a state may constitutionally suspend an insurer's license to sell
profitable lines of insurance until it has complied with mandatory renewal requirements applicable to its line of
automobile insurance). The state cannot compel an insurer licensed in the state to enter a specialized field in
which the insurer has no experience. See Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co. v. Ingram, 226 S.E.2d 498, 507 (N.C.
1976) (finding a violation of the State and Federal constitutions for an act requiring a company to engage in
another business as a condition to its right to continue to carry on an entirely different business which it wants
to be, and is, engaged in). But the State can constitutionally enact legislation compelling insurers to provide
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With regard to the nature of the government act and whether it supports
a taking claim, the compulsory nature of the legislation alone does not result in a
taking because all government regulation is compulsory by nature. 298 The nature
of the state's interest is critical in determining whether a taking has occurred. 299
When the legislation serves important public interests, a taking is less likely to
have occurred. 3 00 As previously discussed in Section II (A), the general regulation of insurance is within state police powers. 3 0 1 As such, the state may enact a
moratorium for the specific purpose of preventing insurance redlining in the
hurricane-affected areas. Preventing discrimination is undoubtedly an important
public interest and mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 2 In addition, after
Hurricane Katrina, several insurance companies may become insolvent and
unable to pay claims under their policies. Other companies may seek to withdraw altogether from the Gulf States' insurance market. This withdrawal could
have serious negative effects on Gulf States' real estate markets as well as their
economies. Any moratorium similar to the moratorium imposed after Hurricane
Andrew may be intended as a stabilizing force in the market, and may be
considered within the state's police power. 303

related coverage for lines it already provides in the state. See Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Harnett, 376 N.E.2d
1280, 1284-1285, (N.Y. 1978) (requiring health insurers to provide maternity coverage); New HampshireVermont Health Serv. v. Whaland, 410 A.2d 642, 645--646 (N.H. 1979) (finding statute compelling Blue Cross
to provide insurance for mental disorders does not violate Due Process or the Commerce Clause).
298
See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,223 (1986) ("[I]t cannot be said that the
Taking Clause is violated whenever legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of
another.").
299
See id. (analyzing state interests).
300
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,485 (1987) (noting that when
the government acts within the public's interest, the governmental action is less likely to be perceived as a
takin3)1' See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 ("The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business."); Sheeran v.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 625, 636 (N.J. 1979) ("It is well established that the insurance business
is strongly affected with a public interest and therefore properly subject to comprehensive regulation in
protecting the public welfare."); Cal. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 109-10 (1951) (noting
that the legislature's broad discretion in adopting police power regulations to promote the public welfare "is
peculiarly apt when the business of insurance is involved-a business to which the government has long had a
special relation."'). One leading treatise has described the state's power as follows:
A state has the unquestioned power to regulate insurance companies and the method of conducting
that kind of business. The business of insurance is considered not to be merely a private right, but a
matter of public concern-a franchise subject to regulation by the state for the public good. And in
such regulation, the legislatures are considered to have large powers and wide discretion.
19 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACrICE § 10321 at 1-3 (1982).
"2
See supra text accompanying notes 233-238.
303 See Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. State of Florida, 141 F.3d 1427, 1433 (llth Cir. 1998) (noting that the
moratorium imposed after Hurricane Katrina was within the state's police power).
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Thus, whether an insurer can pursue a viable taking claim may depend
on the specific statutory scheme imposing the moratorium, the nature and length
of the moratorium, and the economic impact the moratorium has on the insurer.
B. The ContractClause

The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
3 °4
"[n]o State shall.., pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.
By its terms, the Contract Clause does not apply to the federal government.3 °5
The Contract Clause limits a state's power to modify its own contracts as well as
to regulate contracts between private parties. 306 Not every modification of a
contractual promise impairs an obligation of contract such that there is a
violation of the Contract Clause. 30 7 For example, the Contract Clause does not
prohibit the states from repealing or amending statutes generally, or from
enacting legislation with retroactive effect.30 8 Nor does a state statute
unconstitutionally impair the obligations of a contract when the contract is
formed after its enactment. 3°
"Although the language of the Contract Clause is facially absolute, its
prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the State 'to
safeguard the vital interests of its people.' 3 10 In evaluating a Contract Clause
claim, courts will consider the following three factors: (1) whether the law
substantially impairs a contractual relationship; (2) whether there is a significant
and legitimate public purpose for the law; and (3) whether the adjustments of
rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties are based upon reasonable
conditions and are of an appropriate nature.311
304

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.

305 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 n.9 (1984) (citing 5 J.
ELLIOTr, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITLTION 546 (2d ed. 1876) and 2 M. FERRAND, RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 619 (1911) ("It could not justifiably be claimed that the Contract Clause
applies, either by its own terms or by convincing historical evidence, to actions of the National Government.").
306 See U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch 87, 137-39, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810) and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L.Ed. 629
(1819)) ("It long has been established that the Contract Clause limits the power of the States to modify their
own contracts as well as to regulate those between private parties.").
307 See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 507-08 (1965) ("For it is not every modification of a
contractual promise that impairs the obligation of contract under federal law, any more than it is every alteration
of existing remedies that violates the Contract Clause.").
308 See id. (stating the same).
309 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co v. Cram, 228 U.S. 70, 85 (1913) (finding that a state
statute did not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contracts made after its enactment).
310 Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power& Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,410 (1983); see also Veix
v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32,38-39 (1940) (noting that all contracts are made
subject to the paramount authority of the state to regulate health, morals and safety as well as the economic
needs of society).
311 See Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 410-13 (discussing the factors to be applied in a Contract
Clause analysis).
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"Total destruction of contractual expectations is not necessary for a
finding of substantial impairment."3 12 Even though state regulation may restrict
a party to gains it reasonably expected from the contract, that does not
necessarily constitute a substantial impairment.3 t3 In determining the extent of
the impairment, a court will consider whether the government has previously
3 14
regulated the industry of the party asserting the Contract Clause claim.
In asserting a Contract Clause claim, an insurer must make a sufficient
showing that any moratorium legislation substantially impaired its insurance
contracts between the carrier and its insureds. An insurance policy provides
coverage for a specified risk for a specified policy period, typically one year. At
the end of the policy period, the insurer reevaluates the risk and decides whether
to remain subject to the risk or to cancel the policy altogether. Under any
moratorium legislation, the legislation would likely force an insurer to continue
the contractual relationships that it could otherwise terminate pursuant to the
contract terms. The forced continuation of a contract that normally would expire
constitutes a substantial impairment of the insurer's contractual rights.
If the insurer can establish a substantial impairment to its contracts, the
state must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the
moratorium legislation. As previously discussed, the state may be able to
demonstrate a legitimate public purpose-precluding insurance redlining and the
protection and stabilization of the state's economy, particularly the housing
market.315 Furthermore, the courts do not require that the public purpose address
an emergency or temporary situation.316
312 Id. at 411; see alsoAllied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,245 (1978) ("The severity
of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear."); Campanelli v. Allstate
Life Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The more severe the impairment, the more searching the
examination of the legislation must be.").
313 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31 (1977) (citing City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965)) (stating that a state may "restrict a party to those gains reasonably to be
expected from the contract").
314 See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940) ("When he purchased into an
enterprise already regulated in the particular to which he now objects, he purchased subject to further legislation
upon the same topic."); Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908) ("One whose rights, such as
they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract
about them.").
315 See, e.g., Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 249-51 (finding Minnesota's Private Pension Benefits Protection
Act, which subjected an employer to a "pension funding charge" if the employer terminated the pension plan or
closed a Minnesota office, violated the Contract Clause because it had a narrow focus as opposed to being
directed at a broad, generalized economic or social problem); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398,444-46 (1934) (determining that the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law which temporarily postponed
foreclosure sales and extended the periods of redemption after an emergency was declared did not violate the
Contract Clause because the State had the legitimate purpose of protecting the welfare of its residents affected
by the housing shortage).
316 See Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412 (noting that while the state must offer a significant and
legitimate purpose for the regulation, courts have recognized justifications that address broader social problems
and not merely emergency situations).
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Because a court would likely determine that the enactment of
moratorium legislation constitutes a legitimate purpose, it would then need to
determine whether the state's modification of the contract's rights and
responsibilities are based upon reasonable conditions, and are appropriate.3 17
"Unless the State itself is a contracting party . . . courts properly defer to
legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular
measure. ' 318 Because, in general, the state is not a party to the insurance
contract, a court would likely defer to the legislature's judgment and conclude
that a moratorium does not constitute an unconstitutional impairment in violation
of the Contract Clause.319
C. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. 3 20 The Due Process Clause not only guarantees fair process, but
also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests. 3 21 The right to enter into contracts is a liberty interest guaranteed by
the Constitution. 322 Property rights and contract rights are normally matters of
private concern, and in general, should be free from governmental interference.323 However, "neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute."324
The constitutional guarantee of liberty does not require that the state withdraw
from legislative supervision over contracts, or preclude the government from
enacting restrictive safeguards, reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed
in the interests of the community. 325 Instead, the guarantee of the constitu-

tionally protected liberty interest implies the absence of arbitrary restraint. 326
317
318

See id. at 412-13 (discussing modification of contracts by states).

319

See, e.g., Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Florida, 141 F.3d 1427, 1434 (1 thCir. 1998) (giving deference to

Id.

Florida's enactment of the Moratorium Phaseout Statute).
320
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
321
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Washington v. Glucksburg 521 U.S. 702, 719
(1997)); see also, Daniels v. Williams 474 U.S. 372,331 (1986) (noting that the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause protects individuals from "certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them").
322
See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549,566-67 (1911) (observing
that a line of cases have held that the Constitution protects a right to contract; specifically finding the right
embraced in the conception of liberty).
323
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,523 (1934) (acknowledging that neitherthe right tocontract
nor property rights are absolute despite their general private nature).
324
Id; see also Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 165, 166 (1895) ("It is within the undoubted power of
government to restrain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts.").
325
See McGuire, 219 U.S. at 567 (discussing states' constitutional obligations towards contracts).
326
Id. (discussing states' constitutional obligations towards contracts); see also Liberty Warehouse Co.
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The Due Process Clause is no longer used by courts to strike down state
laws regulating business "because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought." 327 Legislation affecting economic
interests is presumed constitutional and the burden is on the complaining party to
establish that the legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.328 The
constitutionality of state regulation of the insurance business has been upheld
under the Due Process Clause. 329 To prove a due process violation, an insurer
must establish that the applicable moratorium legislation is "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. 330 This rational-basis review is highly-deferential. 331 In
order for legislation that does not implicate a fundamental right to violate the
requirements of substantive due process, it must be "utterly lacking in rational
justification." 332 Rational-basis review permits a court to consider any conceivable justifications for enacting the legislation. 333 As previously discussed, a
state will likely have enacted moratorium legislation to preclude insurance redlining or to prevent economic disaster in its real estate market, so it cannot be
said that the moratorium legislation lacks any rational justification. Consequently, an insurer is unlikely to succeed when asserting a due process claim.334
v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Mktg. Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71, 97 (1928) ("The liberty of contract guaranteed
by the Constitution is freedom from arbitrary restraint-not immunity from reasonable regulation to safeguard the
public interest."); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963) ("It is well settled that States 'have power
to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so
long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal
law."').
327 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
328 See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (discussing the burden of proof in a
Due Process claim when constitutionality is presumed).
329 See California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1951)
(determining that the diminution in value of the insurer's business because it was less prosperous as result of
governmental regulation was not a taking of property without due process of law); id. at 110 n.2 (citing
numerous cases in which the Court has upheld insurance regulations against Due Process challenges).
330 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). In contrast, the Fourteenth
Amendment "forbids the government to infringe ... 'fundamental' liberty interests at all ... unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993).
331 See Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting the high degree of
deference
given in a rational-review test).
332 Brown v. Mich. City, 462 F.3d 720, 733 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Turner, 207 F.3d
419, 426).
... See Gallo v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Ariz., 349 F.3d 1169, 1181 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]t is
well-established that rational basis scrutiny permits the court to consider any conceivable justifications for
enacting the law.").
334 See Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. State ofFlorida, 141 F.3d 1427, 1430 n.5 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (deciding that
the State of Florida did not lack a rational basis for passing moratorium legislation after Hurricane Katrina and
summarily dismissing insurer's Substantive Due Process claim with little discussion). But see People ex rel.
Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 98 Misc.2d 856, 866 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (finding that the statutory provision
as applied to defendant insurers conscripted and compelled them to continue doing business at a loss in the state
in violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); CJS CONsT. LAW. § 2023 ("[An
insurance company which elects to terminate doing business in a state may be required to do... without
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V. Conclusion
In its traditional definition, "[insurance] 'redlining' is the 'outright
an insurance company ...to provide services solely on the basis of a
of
refusal
property's geographical location.' 3 35 Because of the denied access to a
voluntary market, many individuals in the inner city were treated as second-class
consumers who paid more for less insurance coverage than their suburban
counterparts.336
Some commentators believe that "[t]he unavailability of insurance
coverage stemming from redlining has contributed to the deterioration of
American urban centers and has effectively frustrated attempts at urban
revitalization. 3 37 Although the deterioration of the inner city is a complex
process, no one disagrees with the idea that insurance redlining contributes to
and accelerates the deterioration process.338 The effect of redlining is the
cessation of investment in the redlined area. With no investment, the growth,
repair, or sale of housing is halted because attempts to improve the community
are precluded by a lack of funding. This is disinvestment. 339 Thus, the denial of
property insurance effectively precludes maintenance and improvement of
property. Redlining of the neighborhood guarantees that economic decline will
follow. The net effect of redlining and disinvestment is to spread ghettos. 340 3In
41
that regard, redlining has been characterized as a "self-fulfilling prophecy.
"[T]he right to open housing means more than the right to move from an old
ghetto to a new ghetto. Rather, the goal of our national housing policy is to
'replace the ghettos' with 'truly integrated and balanced living patterns' for

unnecessary disruption, it may not be required, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
continue to do business in a state indefinitely.").
335 Badain, supra note 5, at 4.
336 See Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F.Supp. 1106, 1111 (1979)
(discussing a similar argument made by the Department of Housing of Urban Development in 1978).
337 Comment, Application of Title VIII to InsuranceRedlining, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 472, 472 (1980).
See also David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the Legal
Challenge oflnner-CityEconomic Development, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 427,494 (2000) (arguing that
limited access to affordable insurance is a barrier to economic growth); David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Revisited:
Antimarkets, Consumption, and Empowerment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 16 (2000) (noting that lack of access to
insurance both creates and perpetuates ghetto neighborhoods); Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place:
The Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DmO L. REv. 295, 352 (1999) (arguing that insurance
redlining contributes to the marginalization of inner-cities).
338 See Badain, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing the roots of the redlining problem).
339 See Marianne M. Jennings, Preemption and State Anti-Redlining Regulations: The Need for
Clarification, 1IFORDHAM URB. L.J. 225,227-28 n.6 (1980) (explaining the distinction between redlining and
disinvestment).
3Q
See Badain, supra note 5, at 34-37 (advocating solutions to counter the effects of insurance
redlining). The commentator lays the blame for the decline of neighborhoods in part at the feet of insurance
companies. Id. at 36.
341 See, e.g., id. at 6 (discussing the Hughes Panel's findings).
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persons of all races."' 342 "Insurance redlining" should not be utilized to prohibit
or undermine that goal and, therefore, should be proscribed by the FHA.343
Insurance companies deny using racially discriminatory factors in the
underwriting process and maintain that they use only objective, reliable criteria
as part of the underwriting process. 3" Risk discrimination is not race discrimination. By its nature, the insurance underwriting process seeks to accept
"good" risks while excluding or limiting "bad" risks. At its core, insurance
underwriting tends to be "unfair" in that basic underwriting considerations reflect
generalizations rather than true statistical evidence of risk. Underwriting
guidelines assist the insurance company in maximizing profits and protecting
policyholders against insolvency. There is nothing inherently suspect about this
process.
Efforts by the insurance industry to legitimately differentiate among
risks, however, may produce classifications that effectively discriminate on the
basis of race or some other protected class status.345 One commentator claims
that race is the true factor that insurance companies use to set rates and terms or
to deny insurance all together. 34
Absent discovery of a "smoking gun" that reveals an illegitimate
corporate decision-making process to exclude minorities from insurance risk
pools, redlining can exist as a chameleon throughout an otherwise seemingly
legitimate underwriting process. The current state systems of regulations that
prohibit insurance redlining are based upon the presumption that an insurance
342

Barrick Realty v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1974) (quoting Trafficante v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)).
343 See William E. Murray, Homeowners Insurance Redlining: The Inadequacy ofFederalRemedies
and the Futureof the PropertyInsurance War, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 735,740 (1998) (discussing enacting a federal
law that specifically defines and prohibits insurance redlining as a solution).
3"
See Ruthann DeWolfe, Gregory Squires & Alan DeWolfe, Civil Rights Implicationsof Insurance
Redlining, 29 DEPAUL L. REv. 315, 316-17 (1980) (asserting insurance companies' claims in defense of
redlining). But see William E. Murray, Homeowners Insurance Redlining: The Inadequacy of Federal
Remedies and the Future of the PropertyInsurance War, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 735, 737 (1998) (discussing how
insurance carrier utilizes underwriting practices to redline).
345 See, e.g., United Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Metro. Human Relations Comm'n, 859 F.Supp. 323,329
(N.D. Ind. 1993) (holding that the Indiana Civil Rights agency had subject matter jurisdiction to investigate
complaints that homeowners' insurer had engaged in prohibited racial discrimination through redlining). A
plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA either on a theory of disparate impact
or disparate treatment. See Fair Housing in Huntington Comm. Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 316 F.3d 357,366
(2d Cir. 2003); Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 466 (3d Cir.
2002); Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cit. 2002); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d
300, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1997). A facially neutral practice may violate civil rights laws if it has a "significantly
discriminatory" impact upon minorities or perpetuates discrimination. Cf Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989) (analyzing disparate impact claim under Title VII); Paige v. California, 291 F.3d
1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 481 (9th Cir. 1983)

(same).
346 See Robert Yaspan, Note, Property Insurance in the American Ghetto: A Study in Social
Irresponsibility,44 S. CAL. L. REv. 218, 233, 236 (1971) (summarizing the insurance industry's effective

segregation of ghetto areas).

PROHIBITING DE FACTO INSURANCE REDLINING

company's underwriting risk profiling is legitimate, absent specific evidence to
the contrary. This presumption devalues state governmental concern and has
sustained a disjointed patchwork of inconsistent state regulation that haphazardly
proscribes insurance redlining with little practical efficacy.
To state regulators, there is a disconnect between the theoretical social
phenomenom of insurance redlining and the real world practice of modem
insurance underwriting. Debate over insurance redlining is little more than an
echo in the halls of academia. Recently, however, the catastrophic aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, which devastated minority-dominated geographic areas in
three states, has given rise to real-life concerns over de facto redlining because of
the potential for massive cancellations or non-renewals of homeowner insurance
policies within the affected states. Attempts to regulate this type of de facto
redlining are idiosyncratic and, in the past, have taken the form of insurance
moratoriums to stabilize the insurance marketplace. This is only a partial
solution. Uniformity in regulating insurance redlining can be achieved by
expanding the scope of the FHA.
Holding insurance companies captive to a state insurance marketplace
can have significant national impact. When catastrophic losses occur from
natural disasters and the natural disaster is potentially recurring, insurance
347
companies that are required to stay on the "bad" risk may face insolvency.
The insolvency and ultimate bankruptcy of multi-state insurance companies
creates substantial disruption in the insurance marketplaces of other states.
Typically, state legislatures have put in place guaranty funds to protect against
348
insolvency of insurance companies. The legislative objective of these acts is
to make the guaranty fund liable to the same extent that an insolvent insurer
limit fund
would be liable under the policy.349 State government funds typically
350
exposure, however, to less than the coverage limits of the policy.
347 See infra notes 244-250 and accompanying text; see also Albert D. Crenshaw, Insurance Firms
Curbing Coveragefor Homeowners-CoastalAreas Most Affected by Retrenchment, WASH. POST, May 8,

1993, at El (reporting that several insurance companies escaped permanent insolvency because of large capital
infusions from their parent corporations).
3
See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 22:1376 (2007).
349 See State-Wide Ins. Co. v. Curry, 372 N.E.2d 31, 31 (N.Y. 1977) ("While the Resources Insurance
Company became insolvent after the accident, the insurance policy itself survived, and the obligations owed its
");
Oregon Ins. Guar. Ass'n v.
insured were assumed by the Security Fund for the full amount of the policy ....
Hall, 113 P.3d 452, 455 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the guaranty fund steps into the shoes of an insolvent
insurer only if the claim is a "covered claim"); Gallagher v. Sidhu, 109 P.3d 840, 842 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
("The objective [of the guaranty fund] is to place both the claimant and the insured in the same position that
they would have been in had the insurer been solvent.").
350 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dynamic Air, Inc., 702 N.W.2d 237, 243 (Minn. 2005) (noting
that Minnesota's guaranty fund does not provide the same level of protection to insureds that the policy issued
by the insolvent insurer); Carrozza v. Greenbaum, 866 A.2d 369, 375 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2004) (noting that
Pennsylvania's guaranty fund "becomes a 'guarantor' with a limit of liability of $300,000 per claimant for
covered claims"). West Virginia Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Potts, 550 S.E.2d 660, 666 (W. Va. 2001) (noting that
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If a regional or national insurance company becomes insolvent because
of another catastrophic hurricane, then all policyholders are affected in all states
where the company has been admitted to do or has written business. For
example, suppose an insurance company issues policies in two states that have
separate and distinct geographic profiles, such as Arizona and Florida. Arizona
may not be subject to the catastrophic events of hurricanes, yet its residents will
be impacted directly by a hurricane or other catastrophic event in Florida when,
by legislative fiat, a moratorium is enacted by the Florida legislature that causes
the insolvency of the insurance company. Florida's residents would seek
protection from the insolvency by looking for payment from Florida's guaranty
fund.35 ' Meanwhile, Arizona's residents would lose the security for which they
bargained in purchasing their policies should they experience a covered loss
because the insurance company is now insolvent. The only recourse Arizona
residents would have is Arizona's guaranty fund.352
When a catastrophic loss like Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Andrew
occurs, the affected state has a vested interest in protecting its citizens' property,
usually without regard to how its legislation impacts citizens of other states.
This vested interest in one state must be balanced against the interests of
policyholders in other states when a regional or national insurance company is
involved. The only effective way to balance all of these interests is to
"federalize" these types of catastrophic losses so that the interests of all affected
states can be balanced and protected.
In response to the riots in the 1960s, Congress enacted UPPRA.353 The
federal government can react similarly to the catastrophic events of recent
hurricanes by enacting legislation that would ensure the availability of insurance
in areas prone to natural disasters. The most effective way to manage that

claim presented to guaranty fund is "subject to the statutory per claim limit of $300,000 up to the maximum
liability of the insurance policy issued by the insolvent insurer").
351 See Gallagher, 109 P.3d at 842 (noting that the objective of a guaranty fund is to place both the
claimant and the insured in the same position that they would have been in had the insurer been solvent).
352 Arizona's guaranty fund presents as a typical guaranty fund. Generally, six requirements must be
met before the guaranty fund is obligated to participate in a claim: (1) the claimant or insured must be residents
of the State at the time of the loss or the property involved must be permanently located in the Sate; (2) the
carrier must be authorized to transact business in the State either when the policy was issued or the loss
occurred; (3) the carrier must be adjudged insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction; (4) the claim amount
must be in excess of a particular minimum, e.g., $100; (5) the loss must be covered by the insolvent carrier's
policy; and (6) the claim must arise within a statutorily proscribed period. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20661(3) & (5)(2001), ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-667(A)(l)-(3) (2001), and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-667(B). The
maximum amount of compensation from the fund is capped, typically at $299,999.99 per "covered claim," but
not to exceed the face amount of the policy from which the claim arises. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-667(B). If any
other insurance policy is applicable to the claim, the insolvent carrier's policy (and, hence, the guaranty fund) is
considered by statute to be "excess" coverage. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-673(C) (2001).
353 See, e.g., Dunn v. Midwestem Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F.Supp. 1106, 1111 (S.D.
Ohio 1979).
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situation and to protect against de facto redlining would be to expand the scope
of the FHA to include the regulation of insurance redlining.
Utilization of the FHA not only helps to bring uniformity to the
regulatory landscape but also would assist with the unusual situation that has
occurred in the Gulf States where large losses may lead to the enactment of
moratoriums that threaten the insolvency of insurance carriers. Only federal
legislation can take into consideration multi-state boundaries and protect all
policyholders in all states. This would require amendment of the McCarranFerguson Act to permit federal intervention, 354 as well as a comprehensive
355
amendment to the FHA regarding the prohibition of insurance redlining.
As Richard Bach observed, a disaster can become a blessing, and a
blessing can become a disaster.356 The recent disasters have brought to the
forefront the potential issues of insurance redlining. The authors have presented
a cogent discussion of the historical events and statutory enactments prohibiting
discrimination in order to draw out a debate on the issue of insurance redlining.
While the issue of de facto insurance redlining is now prominent in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina, typically it is a chameleon within the legitimate context of
insurance underwriting and difficult to discern. To that extent, the disasters have
become a blessing by bringing to the public debate the concerns of de facto
redlining.
The blessing can become a disaster, however, if moratoriums are used as
the sole mechanism to preclude the wholesale withdrawal of carriers from state
residential property and casualty markets as a means to rectify the situation.
Although arguably an imperfect enforcement mechanism, federalizing prohibittions against insurance redlining would bring consistency throughout the states
regarding insurance underwriting practices that could violate the FHA. Furthermore, any FHA amendments should include provisions that would prohibit
individual insurance carriers from engaging in underwriting that would prevent
minorities located in geographical areas prone to natural disasters from obtaining
insurance, which would, in turn, preclude them from obtaining the American
dream of owning a home. Finally, the amendment should include provisions that
would regulate or preclude states from enacting moratorium legislation that
would place policyholders in other states at risk by increasing the potential for
354
See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1997). The operative portion of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides: "No
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance ....
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1997).
355 Clarification to the FHA with regard to whether it permits or prohibits insurance redlining would be
necessary. Presently, there exists a split of authority on the question of whether the FHA prohibits insurance
redlining. See, e.g., United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.Co., 24 F.3d at 1015 (holding insurance redlining is
prohibiting by FHA). But see, Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419,423-24 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating
that the FHA does not proscribe insurance redlining).
356

RICHARD BACH, ONE 121 (Dell Publishing 1989) (1989).
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insurance company insolvencies which, in turn, could potentially preclude others
from obtaining the American dream as well.

